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All Muslims agree that the Sunnah, is one of two major primary sources second to the 
Qur'an - of their religious worldview and plays a fundamental role in the shaping of their 
civilization. Sunnah though needs to be qualified. Fazlur RaDman argues that what the 
first three generations of t:1:yslims understood with Sunnah was the concept of Sunnah 
and not necessarily it's content. This means that Muhammad was only the starting point 
for Sunnah. in other words his Sunnah is "the Ideal Sunnah" but he was in no way its seal 
in terms of its content. After his demise subsequent generations would continue to 
produce Sunnah through their interpretation and fl'ee-thinking activity under the aegis of 
the "Ideal Sunnah". RaDman calls this the living Sunnah. However, later Muslims, for the 
last twelve centuries. have a different understanding of Swmah. Sunnah has become 
synonymous with badith as it is found primarily in the six canonical works of hadith. 
This change, RaDman argues. came about after MUDammad b. 'IdrIs al-ShaficI articulated 
his hayan scheme, which in a nutshell means that the entirety of law resides in two texts 
the Quran and the Sunnah and that Sunnah is only the Sunnah of Mul)ammad (concept 
and content). In search for uniformity and stability, Ral)man claims, that ShaficI destroyed 
the living Sunnah or more precisely the organic relationship between Sunnah, ijtihad 
(progressive interpretation) and ijmiic• But was this living Sunnah conceptually linked to 
the "Ideal Szmnah" of the Prophet? Why did ShiifiCI decimate an entire tradition and what 
were his reasons and how did he do it? This thesis seeks to answer these questions by 
critically analyzing Ral)man's living Sunnah notion. On the other hand whilst it 
appreciates ShaficI's argument for the Sunnah, of the Prophet only, as the exclusive 
legislative supplement to the Quran it problematizes how Shafi<I dealt with the materials 
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The foundation of Islamic civilization was laid when MuJ:lammad b. cAbd-Allah 
proclaimed in Rammjan 609 C.E. that he had received the first revelation, which would 
continue over the next twenty-three years. Revelation is thus the pivotal dimension of 
the Islamic civilization; we can conclude that if not for revelation there would be no 
Islamic civilization.' That however does not mean that revelation, emanating from an 
extrahistorical transcendental source of a dissimilar nature, (ma~'dar mufariq) and 
external as it were to the human being, alone contributed to the genesis and growth of 
the Islamic civilization. Rather it was the constant dialectical engagement of Muslims 
with their lived reality on the one hand, and their submission to and engagement of 
revelation on the other, that nurtured the Islamic civilization (Abn Zayd, 1994:9). 
According to Mabrnk it was necessary for revelation, in order to remain relevant to the 
human reality and avoid stagnation, to be concretized in history (Mabrnk, 2002: 78). 
Together with revelation MuJ:lammad's behaviour, (decisions, activities etc.), given his 
normative status known as the Sunnah make up the divine texts (ai-no,?!! aPi/aM) that 
are preserved in human language. In short the Qur)an and the Sunnah are - the - two 
primary texts of the Islamic civilization Ula~larah al-I1a0'Y al-)iliihl).2 
1 By civilization here I do not mean the existential aspect of civilization, in the sense that human beings 
are essentially civilized. From an Islamic religious position, there is only one true and correct 
civilization, which is the divine founded religion of Islam. Rather when I speak about civilization here, I 
refer to the making of many different civilizations within history characterized by its different and unique 
military, intellectual, economic, social, religious, cultural and political achievements, that which 'Ibn 
Khaldun calls cifm al-'lImran 
2 What I mean with Sunnah being revelation is that Muslims, especially after al-Shafi' i and the success 
of his Bayan scheme, came to see Sunnah itself as the revelation, albeit indirect, of God or what came to 
be known as wahi ghavr matlu, As for Sunnah as text I refer here to it being seen as synonymous with 
hadith (again after the triumph of the formal Hadith Movement) as compliled in canonical texts the most 










During his lifetime, the Prophet was the sole religious and political guide for his 
community. The Qur'an on two occasions mentions that Mul)ammad would die and he 
himself mentioned this fact, on numerous occasions. Qur'an 3: 144 states: "MulJammad 
is but a Messenger; Messengers before him had come and gone. If he dies or is killed 
will you then turn back on your hills ... ?" 
The Prophet's death then meant the absence of the fountainhead of the civilization of 
revelation. With his death his religiously authoritative personal guidance was cut off. 
However the Qur'an and his exemplary conduct embodied in the Sunnah remained for 
the eternal guidance of his community (Ral)man, 1966: 43). 
As a result of the Prophet's death the 'ummah also now had to reconstitute itself as a 
post-prophetic, post- revelatory unit and to begin to work out its own destiny in the 
light of its understanding of the prophetic-revelatory event that was initially brought 
into being through the interpretation and implementation of the divine wilL Their 
understanding of God's activity, what is referred to as the "pre-theological" did not 
solely focus on a scriptural revelation, but on a revelatory event in which a scriptural 
revelation was the principal, but not the only aspect of God's revelatory activity 
(Graham, 1977: 11-19). 
They had to interpret the Qur'an and Sunnah and assign meaning to revelation since 
humankind, as the phenomenologists say, is a 'meaning-giving transcendental subject' 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: xix). In doing so they had to ensure that the authenticity 











they were potential critics.3 At the same time the revelation had to remain relevant to 
the changing exigencies in terms of time and space. This process can essentially be 
traced back to two contesting trends. 
The first trend is what Ral.1man calls the 'living Sunnah', which in his view represents 
the original and natural way of how the Sunnah was developed and preserved during 
the first century and a half of Islam . .f The Prophetic Sunnah, the "Ideal Sunnah" was 
only an 'umbrella concept' and the starting-point for its continuous interpretation that 
would continually add to the content of the Sunnah. The second trend was that of the 
forula! Ijadfth movement that saw the Sunnah as that which \vas found only in the 
traditions ascribed to the Prophet. Numerous compilations of hadith texts in six famous 
works known as the Six Canonical Texts and other works came to be accepted as the 
authoritative depositories of the Sunnah. The idea that Sunnah equals hadith then 
gained currency. Today most Muslims scholars and laity alike understand the Sunnah 
to be synonymous with the standard collections of hadith. 
This thesis critically engages the first trend. It attempts, in the first instance to ascertain 
whether the living Sunnah functioned within a coherent and consistent framework or as 
an undefined arbitrary exercise that lacked an intellectual. moral and scientific basis. In 
the second instance, it examines the extent to which activities and decisions of the 
living Sunnah might have been merely political decrees of the official political 
3 The hermeneuticist E.O. Hirsch Jr. confirms this view in his notion that says, criticism must police its 
potentially anarchic details in order to secure the meaning of a text, divine or human thereby saving it 
from the ravages of history, for meaning remains constant (Eagleton. 1983: 67-68). 
4 The early generations are the first three generations: the '$a!uJ!Jah (Companions), the Tabi'On 
(Successors) and the 'AtM< al-Tahi<fn (Successors to the Successors). It was with the birth and "triumph" 
of the formallJadith movement, according to RaDman. that the formative period of the early generations 
came to a halt. In addition to time, the demarcation between the first three generations and the ones that 











authority and in general motivated by political activity in general by both the State and 
political opposition. A critique of the living Sunnah, essentially requires engaging 
Mubammad b. )Idris al-ShaficI (d.204/820) though, for Ral)man credits Shafi'T with the 
severing of the organic relationship between Sunnah, ijtiluid and ijma( and as such of 
the living Sunnah. 
In my critique, I draw primarily on the ideas of two scholars. The first is that of (All 
Mabruk in his work Al-Imamah wa Cl Siy(lsah. Mabruk argues that in order to 
understand the Islamic cultural legacy one must begin by deconstructing its 
epistemology and by extension ontology and find how it has hitherto been in the 
grip of politics and the political authority. This is Mabruk argues, fundamental for the 
effective interpretation of revelation, which is constantly reproduced in history. 
Interpretation must take place within an epistemological paradigm that is far removed 
from politics (Mabruk, 2002: 77). 
The second scholar whose ideas I employ is Fazlur Rabman. In his book Islam and 
Modernity Rabman writes of Islam's central doctrines: One-Creator-Sustainer God and 
an ethically based socio-political order. The Prophet, he contends, nurtured a deep God 
consciousness aimed at establishing essential human egalitarianism. The central 
concern of the Qur)an is the conduct of humankind on this earth and that moral values 
cannot be made and unmade by man at his own whim and desires (Ral)man, 1982: 13-
19). In light of Ral)man's thought, which from the onset appears contradictory, the 











Summary of Chapters 
In Chapter one I discuss and analyze the living Sunnah primarily in the context of, what 
Fazlur Ral;tman calis, the organic relationship between Sunnah, iitihad and iima. I look 
specifically at concepts such as iimac, qiyas and Jisti/:lsan showing that they were not 
coherently defined, and were employed arbitrarily, by the early generations. My 
argument is concretized by a reading of two important second century scholars and 
champions of the living Sunnah tradition namely Malik b. Anas and) Abu Yusuf. 
In Chapter two I seek to prove my claim that the living Swmah was in essence, though 
not exclusively, a political experience. Here like Ral;tman, I give vivid illustrations of 
examples of the living Sunnah and juxtapose them with examples that Ral)man cites. 
By doing this, I hope to expose the incoherent structure, the arbitrary nature and 
essentially political disposition of the living Sunnah. 
In Chapter three I interrogate the relationship bet\veen the scholars and the political 
authority of early Islam in order to assess which of the two exercised the greatest 
impact on the Islamic cultural legacy. I conclude that it was the political authority, 
albeit it not exclusively who did so. The scholars in turn, although independent, lived 
for most of the time in the shadow of the political authority. In short, I highlight the 
negative politicization of the Islamic cultural legacy , s epistemology. 
Chapter four critically discusses ShafiCI's hayan paradigm. I defend the central 
argument of the hayan: that the Sunnah of the Prophet is the exclusive legislative 
supplement to the Qur)an. This argument thus in essence opposes the living Sunnah. I 











naskh to identify contradictions in the Sunnah corpus as merely apparent 
contradictions. In other words I argue that Shafiers dictum that the Sunnah (its material 
content) of the Prophet does not under any circumstances contradict God's Book is an 
arbitrary conclusion on his part in his endeavour to establish the haydn scheme. 
This study then finds that the living Sunnah was an incoherent process that functioned 
arbitrarily and permeated with conf1ict. It bequeathed so many excesses that the move 
towards formalism was only a matter of time. It is under these circumstances that 













The Living Sunnah 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (Jackson, 2002: 177) 
We are under the Constitution, but the constitution is what the judges 
say it is. 
Justice Evans Hughes (Moosagie, u.p: 20) 
1) Sunnah and Authority in Early Jurisprudence 
Early jurisprudence refers primarily to juristic activity before Shafi<I's 
methodology, which, according to (I:Iallaq, 1997: 22-35; 1993: 587-591; 
Spectorsky, 2002: 51-79) had little if any impact on juristic circles of his time or 
of the generation( s) that followed him throughout the ninth century (C.E.). Jurists 
who were contemporaries of Shilficl as well those who came after him throughout 
the ninth century such as )Is1)aq b. Rahaway (d. 8/853) did not adopt ShaficI's 
methodology (ijallaq, 1997: 28; Spectorsky, 2002: 55). For ShaficI Sunnah meant 
the Sunnah of the Prophet, meaning that Sunnah was synonymous to the Sunnah 
of the Prophet (Schacht, 1979: 58). 
This chapter is a critical reading of Fazlur Rahman's living Sunnah. which he 
describes as the instrument by which the early generations of Muslims, through 
their free-thought activity, developed the Prophetic model into a definite code of 
human behaviour. I read the living Sunnah in light of Joseph Schacht's 











Muhammadan Jurisprudence. Schacht's living tradition is a nothing more than a 
scientific account filled with quantitative statements that describe the practices 
and legal opinions of the early generations.' It does not bid \vell to utilize it in 
some future project of reconstruction (Motzki, 2002: 40). This free exercise of 
opinion by the ancient schools' in the absence of a coherent framework Schacht 
calls the 'living tradition' whence from Rahman derived the notion of the lining 
Sunnah. 
Schacht is perhaps the mam source of RaDman's notion. His extensive and 
systematic work on hadith of a legal nature provided RaDman with both the tools 
and material to conceptualise his own unique idea of Slinnah. RaDman though 
criticizes Western Islamic Studies for failing to distinguish between Sunnah as 
concept and Sunnah as content. Lammens and Margoliuth held that the Sunnah 
was entirely the continued work of the pre and post-Islamic Arabs (RaDman, 
2000: 132). Schacht saw it as a relatively late post concept that referred initially 
to the ideal and evolved practice of the communities of Iraq, Madlnah and Syria 
expressed in the local doctrines and not yet exclusively embodied in traditions 
from the Prophet (Schacht, 1979). In RaDman's view it gives too simple an 
account of the situation and obscures an understanding of the early development 
I This chapter nor this thesis - will not investigate the veracity of Joseph Schacht's findings in 
his The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. However for an in depth account of Schacht's 
critics (those who engaged his results and the sources and methods he used), those who adopted 
his results without qualification, and those with reservations who have modifications, 
see Harold Motzki's The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence Aleccan Fiqh Befbre the Classical 
Schools (English edition, 2002) pp. 36-49. People such as John Wansbrough have used Schacht's 
findings as their point of departure. See John Wansbrough' s Qur 'anic Studies: Sources and 
Methods of Scriptural Interpretation (I 977). Recent years have seen the proliferation of works 
that are critiques and refutations - whatever their merits - of Schacht's conclusions on Sunnah, 
the development of Muslim jurisprudence, and his thesis on al-Shafi'i. See Muhammad al-
'Azami's On Schacht's Origins ofl14uhammadan Juri,lprlldence (1985), Wael Hallaq's A History 
of Islamic Legal Theories (1997) as well as Motzki's Origins. Specifically written as a refutation 












of Islam. My analysis, which is limited to RaDman's study focuses upon, what 
RaDman calls, the organic relationship between Sunnah )ijtihad and ijmiY, which 
defined his living Sunnah conceptually and methodologically. 
Rahman's notion of living S'unnah is ideological. It describes the historical only 
in proportion to his conception of what Sunnah once was and more so what it 
ought to mean for the present and the future especially in relation to his 
endeavour, as a Muslim Modernist, to transform the intellectual tradition of 
Islam. Hence he employs Schacht's living tradition ideologically and presents an 
argument for contemporary progressive Islam while grappling with the current 
dominant conservative religious discourse. Motzki indicates that he defused 
Schacht's results interpretatively meaning that he reformulated it as his own 
interpretation (Motzki, 2002: 38-39). Here, it must be emphasised, that RaDman 
did not simply adopt Schacht's findings uncritically. It will be a mistake to 
conclude that he merely took Schacht as a source, used his methods, and 
employed his results. 
Rahman is decidedly anti-Shaficl and unashamedly pro-ancient schools and the 
early jurists. For him Shafi(l's project was necessarily retrogressive. In his quest 
for stability, he reversed the natural progressive order of the living Sunnah 
dealing a blow to creativity and originality. Schacht does no such thing. He is 
ncither pro nor anti-Shafier's nor for that matter is he pro or anti-early jurists. He 
simply says that Shafiei's carried Muhammadan jurisprudence to a degree of 











achieved before without suggesting that this was necessarily a good or a bad 
thing. 
2) Linguistic Meaning of Sunnah 
Ibn Durayd states that the original meaning of the verb sanna is ~'awyvara (al-
shay)a) , which means to fashion or produce something as a model (Ral)man, 
1994: 2). If it is said that someone sanna al-shay)a yasunnhu sunnan, it means 
he/she fashioned a thing (;\Qw~varahu) and this thing is masm7n in other words 
mll~awwar (fashioned) (al-ZubaydI, u.d: 244). On one occasion the Prophet 
encouraged people to give charity to a man described as qahl~l al-sunnah 
(literally ugly in his appearance); sunnah meaning al-:)ilrah that is picture or 
appearance Clbn al-Manzur, u.d: vol. 3: 2124-2125). Hence the verse in the 
Qur'an that man is created from /:zama)in masnilll, masniln meaning mu~awwar. 
In addition to that the verb sanna thus denotes change meaning that something 
can be done for a special cause and is not applicable to another situation. 
Alternatively, it could have a certain meaning and when the reason behind that 
meaning dissipates the action adopted remains as a practice or norm to be 
emulated. In his Afuft'adat al-Qur)iin, Raghib aPI~fahanI describes sunnan as the 
plural of Sunnah meaning the way or the manner [to something]. The Sunnah of 
the Prophet was his way, which he affirmed as his example (aPI~fahanI, 1961: 
245). Slmnah means, strictly speaking, nothing more than 'precedent', or 'way of 
life' (Schacht, 1979: 58) and the straight path ahead or the path without deviation 











became a path (maslak) for those who came after them. It is al-rariqah (the way) 
and al-sfrah (the course) whether good or bad, beautiful or ugly. (al-Zubaydi, u.d: 
244). It is in this sense that Sunnah is used in the following ~adlth: "Whoever 
fashions (introduces) a good Sunnah will be rewarded ... and whoever fashions 
(introduces) a bad Sunnah complete ... " (Rahman, 1994: 3) 
The path, trodden and changing, once fashioned as a model then as in the case of 
the Prophet becomes exemplary conduct finding its fulfillment in being followed. 
According to the A1awrid, Sunnah means norm, rule, custom, usage, tradition, 
law and line of conduct. In short then Sunnah in essence refers to two things: one, 
the fashioning of something and how it appears and two, a path (whether good or 
bad) that is to be followed. 
3) Understanding and Usage of Sunnah by Early Muslims 
The early generations regarded Sunnah as a behavioral term, meaning that as 
practice, it was not specific in content and that a particular practice need not have 
been from a specific authority like for example from the Prophet on order that it 
qualify as Sunnah. Sunnah referred to practices or theoretical positions attributed 
at times to the authority of the Prophet and sometimes to that of the Companions, 
the early Caliphs, and the Successors and their own scholarly utterances 
(Spectorsky, 2002: 55). Traditions from the Prophet were used on the same level 
as traditions from the Companions and Successors and interpreted in light of 











CUthman b. cAfan (the third Caliph) in a conversation informs )Ibn cUmar that the 
rebels gave him the choice between stepping down and being killed. )Ibn CUmar 
advises him not to take off Allah's garment (the Caliphate) for that will become 
[a] Sunnah and every time people detest their Caliph they will either depose or 
kill him (Al-BaladhirI, 1980: vol. 5,76; Al-Rawaziq, 2003: 131). On asked 
whether a wife can be separated from a husband who is unable to maintain her 
)Ibn al-Musayyab replied yes as that was [a] Sunnah (al-Zui)aylI, 1989: 513).2 
The famous Traditionalist and prominent Medinese lawyer Mui)ammad )ibn 
Shihab al-Zuhrl (a Successor) on the testimony of women states: "The established 
Sunnah has been (ma(lat al-sunnatu) that the testimony of women is not valid in 
al-f:zlldild (punitive crimes), marriage and divorce (al-Zui)aylI, 1985, vol. 7: 74l 
Sunnah then during the early generations was used very generally without 
reference to a particular authority and was susceptible to continuous change. It 
was used to refer to a practice or tradition (f:zadlth) or a combination of both with 
the Prophet, a Companion, a Successor or a scholarly pronouncement as 
equivalent authorities like Malik b Anas author of al-MllWa!!ah the earliest extant 
work on ljadlth 
)Ibn CUmar was thus cautioning CUthman from introducing a novel act, [a] 
Sunnah that was till then not Sunnah. )Ibn al-Musayyab does not specifically 
mention the Prophet as the source of the Sunnah in question here nor does he 
quote a particular tradition with its chain of narrators. Similarly al-ZuhrI was 
2 Wahbah al-ZuQayli ~ articulating the classical view of the formal Hadith movement ~ interprets 












possibly referring to the Sunnah as it was practiced without reference to a 
particular Tradition (of the Prophet). The Jraqian jurist )AbO YOsuf charged the 
I:Iijazl lawyers when asked for authoritative proof for their rulings simply replied 
that it was the established Sunnah; ) AbO YOsuf however does not regard it to be 
the Sunnah of the Prophet but in all probability the decision of a market tax 
collector or a tax collector in an outlying district (Shafi<i, 1983. voL7: 353). 
This activity of free interpretation however led to a divergence in views fraught 
with disagreement, conflict and ultimately chaos. )Ibn al-MuqaffaC who was a 
sharp critic of this old idea of Sunnah advised the second CAbbasid Caliph al-
Man~Or (d. 158) that in the absence of an agreed-upon Sunnah of the Prophet, to 
review the different doctrines (of ancient schools and independent jurists), codify 
and enact his own decisions in the interest of uniformity, and declare it binding 
on all qiidL,,' (Lambton, 1981 t He deplored the divergences in the jurisprudence 
that existed between the schools of law in the great cities such as KOfa, Ba~rah 
and Uijaz. 
4) The Sunnah-Ijtihad and I jmaC Relationship 
Jacques Derrida sought through deconstruction, to show that first principles are 
products of particular system of meaning commonly defined by what they 
exclude and part of a sort of binary opposition. What Derrida aimed to point out 
is that one tenn in a binary opposition is subconsciously or implicitly assigned 
3 In another transmission al-ZuhrI ascribes this Sunnah as the established practice since the time 











dominance over the other (Mautner, 2002: 69). An example of such a first 
principle is a male- dominated society where man is the founding principle (the 
one assigned dominance) and woman the excluded opposite (Eagleton, 1983: 
132). Applying this Derriddian definition of binary oppositions can help us to 
understand both Rahman's living Sunnah notion and Shafi'!' s notion of Sunnah -
anyone of the two can be taken to be the first principle and the other it's 
excluded binary opposite in their undermining of each other - can help us to 
understand how both conceptualised Sunnah. For now I will discuss Rahman's 
notion of Sunnah. Shari'I will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
4.1) Rahman's 'Ideal Sunnah' Notion 
The person of the Prophet undoubtedly constituted an authoritative figure. and his 
practice a Sunnah for the nascent Muslim community and all Muslims thereafter. 
As Ral)man says there was undoubtedly the Sunnah of the Prophet (Ral)man, 
1994: 9). Ral)man, however, distinguishes and rightly so - between two 
meanings of Sunnah: one, Sunnah as concept a valid and operative concept from 
the very beginning of Islam, which has its starting point the Ideal Sunnah of the 
Prophet symbolized by what Weber. calls the charismatic authority of 
Mul)ammad (Dabashi, 1989: 2). It was the actual life of the Prophet and the 
milieu in which he moved that gave coherence to and provided the central 
activity for the Qur)an's intelligible teaching (Ral)man, 2000: 154). And two 
Sunnah as content, which was the result of the freethinking activity of the early 
generations (Companions, Successors and the Successors of the Successors) 











relationship between the Sunnah, ijtihad and ijmiF, allowed Sunnah to grow, 
naturally, in content as a result of continuous interpretation (ijtihad) making it co-
extensive with ijma( (consensus). RaDman states: 
... the Sunnah of the Prophet was a valid and operative concept fTom the very beginning 
of Islam and remained so throughout; that the SUl1nah-content left by the Prophet was 
not very large in quantity and that it was not something meant to be absolutely specific; 
that the concept Sllnnah after the time of the Prophet covered validly not only the 
SUl1nah of the Prophet himself but also the interpretations of the Prophetic SUl1nah; that 
the Sunnah in the last sense is co-extensive with the ijmt( of the community which is 
essentially an ever expanding process; and finally that after the mass-scale Hadilh 
movement the organic relationship between the Sunnah ijfilJ(ie/ and i/ma( was destroyed. 
(Rahman, 1994: 6) 
4.2) ~jtihiid 
Ijtihlid is the second and arguably most important element in the relationship that 
Rahman designates as organic between Sunnah, ijtihiid and ijmii(. Ijtihad for 
Rahman, was an active and independent factor not in any way akin to Shafici's 
conception of ijtihiid. Ijtihad he argues was the necessary instrument whereby the 
early generations developed the Prophetic model into a definite and specific code 
of human behaviour hereby adding to its content (Rahman, 1994: 14). In this way 
tjtihiid has its roots in the "Ideal Sunnah" and then adds to the content of the 
Sunnah. In that it was the instrument by which the demand for continuous fresh 
thinking was satisfied ijtihad engendered simultaneously tolerance and 
acceptance of diversity that crystallised into a phenomenon ijma(, which in turn, 











Rahman's delineation, of an orgamc relationship between Sunnah (the Ideal 
Prophetic Sunnah) and ijtihad and ijma( with Sunnah at the forefront for the 
continuous production of Sunnah (content), is a rather arbitrary presupposition 
and conjecture. That most of the Sunnah 's content was the result of the rational 
activities of the early Muslims, and not that of the Prophet, is evident from 
historical and literary analyses. However that it was conceptually attached to the 
"Ideal Sunnah" of the Prophet is an arbitrary claim that is not proven. This latter 
assertion is based on the following observations: 
The 'living tradition' functioned in the absence of a sound and objectively 
justifiable juristic theory that led to a wide divergence in doctrine with hardly an 
agreement on a single point of law eAn~arI, 1991: 495). These disagreements 
were not simple or triviaL They went at times to the very heart of fundamental 
moral and religious Islamic invariables, such as the five universals (al-ku/llyyat 
al-khamsah) regarding life, intellect, honour, wealth and religion. 4 It is for this 
reason that 'Ibn al-MuqaffaC (d. 142) disparages ra))' as used in the ancient 
schools and advised the Caliph in the absence of an agreed-upon Sunnah to 
supersede and regulate it (Schacht, 1979: 103). As 'Ibn al-MuqaffaC states 
And that which [requires the urgent attention of] the Prince of the Believers should 
look into is with regards to the divergence, between these two cities [Syria and 
'Iraq], other [great] cities and the periphery areas, on many issues to the extent that 
contradictory rulings have reached alarming proportions on matters of blood [law of 
retribution], sexual conduct privacy and property. Hence the spilling of blood ... is 











(~aram) in KUfa and likewise there is divergence within KOfa so that [something] 
will be declared lawful in one of its regions and forbidden in another region. 
(,Ibn al-Muqaffa" u.d: 353). 
As an arbitrary exerCIse that lacked uniformity and consistency, the living 
Sunnah had the propensity for producing retrogressive decisions to the same 
extent that it produced progressive ones. Jurists of a particular regional school 
displayed a marked intolerance towards jurists of another school; a living 
tradition pervaded by general hostility to disagreement. 
The early ijtihad phenomenon is not clearly defined in its relationship to Sunnah 
it is definitely not well disposed towards disagreement that with time (the 
classical era) came to be located somewhere between a crude as opposed to the 
later strict qiyas and istif:zsan both which translate as arbitrary reasoning. For as 
Schacht says, all individual reasoning whether purely arbitrary and personal or 
inspired by an effort at consistency, started at vague beginnings (Schacht, 1979: 
98). 
4.2.1) /jtihiid: Lost Between Qiyas and J/sfihsiin 
The ijtihad of the early generations was neither a defined concept nor a coherent 
practice. Their ijtihad was a fluctuation between qiyas, istif:zsan and ra). In a 
given situation they would apply qiyas yet in a situation of a similar nature they 
summarily abandon qiyas for istif:zsan or even for a solitary f:zadith that in 
principal they reject. Schacht calls their qiyas crude qiyas - as opposed to strict 











cases, was originally arbitrary raJy that was modified and fixed into crude 
analogy. 
4.2.1.1) Between !jtihad and Qivas 
The early generations' Ijtihad was akin to crude qiyas; a corollary of ijtihad 
conducted in this manner was that it could be rejected as crudely as it was fixed. 
For example) Abu I:Ianifa discards (Ral)man will call it situational interpretation) 
a Prophetic /:ladirh that allots two shares for a horse and only one for the rider (its 
owner) for participating in jihad. Ire does so on the basis of qiyas reasoning that 
it is, analogically, illogical that an animal receives a greater share a Muslim man 
and ruled that one share be allotted to the man and one for the horse. His student 
Abu Yusuf rejects this crude qiycls arguing that )Abu I:Ianlfa's raJ}' cum qiyas that 
reduced the portion for the horse from two shares to one is equally objectionable 
because it ends up equating an animal to a Muslim. But even more indicative of 
an incoherent practice of Utihad is )Abu Yusufs adoption of the Prophetic 
solitary /:ladfth thereby supporting the position of the Syrian aPAwza(I whom 
) Abu Yusuf usually vehemently differs with. As Schacht says this is a case of 
refined reasoning that led to the rejection of a crude qiyas (Schacht, 1979: 109). 
Here I am not arguing that the early generations' qiyas was not that of Shafi(I, 
rather I wish to point out that their qiyas was not coherently defined and 
moreover that they were erratic in their practice of that very qiyas. Their qiyas 
was more akin to raJ)' that was originally the result of the arbitrary and personal 











opinions of the jurists reached, not only, outside the matrix of revealed texts but 
in the absence of a coherent legal theory concept. 
4.2.1.2) Between Ijtihad and )Istihsan? 
Malik Ibn Anas is reported as having said: "J[ sti~san is nine-tenths of [legal] 
knowledge" (al-Zul)aylL 1996, vol. 2: 735; (Abd RabihI, 1980: 54-58), AI-
SarkhasI defines it as the abandonment of qiyas in consideration of what is easier 
for humankind (Goldziher, 1971: 12),5 [sti~s(ln was in reality just another kind of 
raJy. opposed to qiyiis, Goldziher thought of Jisti~san as canceling the effect of 
qiyiis to formally limit the indiscriminate application of raJ)' (Goldziher, 1971: 
12), On certain issues the 'Iraqians opt for )isti~siin yet quite arbitrarily abandons 
it for qiyiis din a case of a similar nature (Schacht 1979: 111), For example they, 
in deference to a tradition from (Umar, have several culprits executed for 
participating in the murder of one person (AI-Samal)l, 1996: 74), The ostensible 
reason is the consideration of public interest (preservation of life), and therefore 
they opt for istibsiin, Yet, with regard to \vounds (when several culprits only 
5 We must point out though that any discussion on definitions of and differences between these 
concepts will necessarily place us within the classical post living Sunnah era that is removed from 
the formal period wherein our analysis is essentially located, However such a shift in location is 
necessary and helpful for one, a coherent critique of the early generations and the living Sunnah 
legacy, and two, to follow the change and evolution that concepts such as qiyas and istihsan had 
undergone from the formal period of the ancient schools to the classical period, Most, if not al\, of 
these definitions of istihsan were coined during the later classical period under the aegis of usul 
al-jiqh as an organically structured and comprehensive methodology, Usul al~fiqh - the product 
of later scholars according to Sherman Jackson came to operate as a means of imposing 
constraints on the creation of meaning - rather than as a mechanism for actually discovering it 
(Jackson, 2002: 1978), This means that during the early generations' before usul al-fiqh had 
taken shape qiyas and istihsan, were rather unrestricted and undefined concepts, and it was only 
in the classical period that they became terms characterized by restriction in meaning when placed 











injure one person) they abandon it for qiyas as they apply the lex lalions to only 
one culprit (the one who directly inflicted the wound) even though there were 
others who assisted him/her in injuring that person. 
4.3) /jmtY 
Rahman describes the ijma( of the early schools as the product of diversity of 
opinion (ijtihad); a process marked by an informal and natural growth, which 
tolerated and demanded fresh thought that not only lived with but also upon a 
certain amount of disagreement that lead to a widening of the area of agreement 
and thus new ijma( continuously. This account of ljm(Y is rather superficial as 
ijma( simply did not exist during that early era. At most there was consensus 
(ijma() on the essentials - on which no one held, or could hold, a divergent view. 
Difference of opinion on many issues were so pervasive that the word ijmiY was 
not even used. 
In the 4th/1 oth century the phenomenon of textually different ~adiths seen to 
possess a common theme known as al-tawatur al-ma(nawl, was introduced as a 
new concept in the methodology of ~adlth classification (I:Iallaq, 1989: 80-81). In 
this manner ljma( was officially granted religious authoritativeness by virtue of 
such a group of traditions - ascribed to the Prophet - with the common theme that 
the Muslim community will never agree on error; the very religious basis for 
ijma(.6 Rahman's claim that there was an informal ijma(, a product of ijtihad, is 











ijtihad-Sunnah phenomenon whereby the Qur'an and Prophetic Sunnah were 
given to continuous interpretation, which then came to make up the much of the 
content of the Sunnah. 
During the classical era ijma' became a hermeneutical tool in order to deal with 
the huge corpus of contradictory and conflicting opinions of the early generations 
(the progressive ijtihad of the living Sunnah). As Goldziher said: " ... we must 
consider ... that with regard to the importance of ijma' ... the most contradictory 
opinions evolved" (Goldziher, 1971: 32). ljma' was employed hermeneutically by 
the scholars of the classical era as an ideological-political tool to secure religious 
immunity and acceptance for the arbitrary and contradictory opinions of the early 
generations especially the Companions. 
5) The Early Jurists and the living Sunnah 
The early jurists fall under the early, more precisely the first three, generations 
namely the Companions, the Successors and the Successors of the Successors. It 
was, specifically with the third generation that there was a proliferation of jurists 
(called the early jurists) who gained prominence, both, as individual and as 
members of the regional ancient schools. In this study we will critically analyse 
the role of two prominent third generation jurists that will give us a vivid picture 
of the living Sunnah and how it functioned. They are Malik b. Anas (93 to 179) 
and )Abu Yusuf Ya'qub b. )Ibrahlm (112/ to 183). Both left works that survive to 
this day (Malik b. Anas's Muwanah is the earliest surviving work on law/ f:zadith) 
and they left an indelible mark on the Islamic legal-intellectual discourse 











5.1) Malik )Ibn Anas 
Malik b. Anas b. ) AbT cAmir from Yemenite origin \vas born in the year 931713 in 
.Madlnah. He spent his entire life there where he received his education. )Ibn 
Qutaybah al-DinawarI (d. 276) in his book AI-Macririf lists him among the 
scholars of high regard (,Ibn Qutaybah, 1987: 277-280). 
The Egyptian jurist and traditionalist Layrh b. Sacd rejected .Malik's call that all 
Muslims outside Madlnah ought to follow the lawyers and practice of Madinah 
and rejected several Madinan judgments (Dutton, 1996: vol. 3: 26). Layth argues 
that the Successors in Madinah after the Companions held contrary opinions on 
many issues. SaCld )Ibn al-Musayyab and his contemporaries differed strongly 
among themselves and those who came after them differed even more. 
5.1 .1) Authority in Early Maliki Literature 
Early Maliki legal literature was compiled from about a decade before the second 
half of the second century, beginning with the .Muwana. to round about the mid 
third century. An analysis of the Muwana, the Muhkta~ar of )Abu Mu~cab, al-
Mukhta~ar aI-KabIr and al-Mukhta~ar al-Saghir reveals the absence of a 
methodologically structured hierarchy of legal authority. It does not demonstrate 
a linear development in order of a theory of four sources of law but rather a 
dialectical development dependent upon the Qur)aJ1, Sunnah and almost 
equivalently on the local doctrines and the opinions of individuals. This reality is 











characterized by direct appeals to practical reason, i.e., ra)y as well as to custom 
that is local doctrine or practice that constituted part of the broader Sunnah 
(Fadel, 2002). As Brockopp says: "While some of these texts seem to privilege 
the Prophetic Sunnah, others depended on the juristic dicta of famous scholars. 
Still others made no explicit aim to authority. Each of these styles is the result of 
divergent conceptions of legal authority in this period" (Brockopp, 2002: 4-17). 
5.1.2) The Case of RadaCah(Breastfeeding) 
A reading from Kitah al-RatjeY (the chapter on breast feeding) sheds light on 
Malik's reference, to competing and multiple sources of authority in an 
equivalent manner (Malik, 1985: 500-505). 
Reference is made in an equivalent manner to Prophetic, Companion and 
Successor traditions badfths as well as juristic opinions. 7 Some of the Companion 
and Successor f;adfths clearly contradict a Prophetic badfth that states the 
marriage ban is established between a man who has reached the age of majority 
and the woman who breastfed him. Malik narrates that the Prophet commanded 
Sahlah bint Suhayl to breastfeed Salim, her husband's freed slave who reached 
the age of majority, a minimum course of five sucklings for the marriage ban to 
be established between her and Salim. Malik discards the Prophetic tradition in 
favour of one Companion' badlthT and 3 Successor f;adiths, t,\O by SaCld 'Ibn al-
Musayyab and one by al-ZuhrI, which state that the marriage ban is established 
only if breastfeeding takes place in the first two years of the baby's life eilla ma 
7 Companions Hadith mean in this case a statement of a Companion, specifically during the early 










kana fi "I hawlayni). Any breastfeeding beyond the age of two is considered as 
normal food eaten. Malik echoes the opinions of the Companions and the 
Successors. In addition to that Sacld )Ibn al-Musayyab, ZuhrI and Malik ruled that 
even one drop of milk (much or little) establishes the marriage ban again in clear 
contradiction to an alleged Qur)anic verse (below) and Prophetic tradition that 
there must be a minimum of five sucklings. 
This YIalik does after reporting a hadlth by CA)isha stating that: "[It was] 
Revealed in the Qur'an that ten attested breast-feedings establish the marriage 
ban. It was then replaced by five attested breast-feedings [establish the marriage 
ban], the Prophet died whilst it was still recited as Qur)an" (Malik, 1985:505). 
Malik comments on this verse that c A'isha reports on saying: 'This is not what 
the practice [of Madlnah] is on (Malik, 1985: 505). Yet acting on this supposed 
Qur'anic verse and the Prophetic tradition CA)isha practice was not to allow any 
man, who had not completed a minimum of five sucklings by her sister(s) or 
nieces (brothers daughters), ever to call upon her (Burton, 1990: 157). 
(A'isha thus applied the Prophet's command to Sahlah to breastfeed Salim to all 
men. However the rest of the Prophet's wives - with the exception of I:Iaf~a -
were of the opinion that this command of the Prophet was a special ruling 
(rukh~ah) applicable only to Salim. 
There are two observations to be made. One, Malik makes reference to more than 
one source - the Qur)an , the Prophet, Companions, Successors and juristic dicta -











Prophetic Sunnah are discarded in favour of the OpInIOnS of Companions, 
Successors and his opinion as a jurist. 
Here Shafie! mounts a dual attack on the Malikis firstly because they do not 
follow the Sunnah as established by traditions going back to the Prophet. A 
tradition from the Prophet, he held, must be accepted 'whether it is supported by 
the action of a Caliph or any other religious authority or not, for it derives its 
authority from itself that is by virtue of it coming from the Prophet and therefore 
any action contrary to a Prophetic tradition must be discarded. Secondly, and 
more importantly, they are inconsistent in their claim to practice, for whilst they 
give preference to practice (Carnal) over traditions they, however, do not abide to 
practice in a coherent manner and in fact abandoning practice. He says to them: 
"So you relate in this book [the Muwana'] an authentic, well-attested tradition from the 
Prophet and two traditions from 'Umar and then diverge from them all and say that 
judgement is not given according to them and that the practice is not so, yet you do not 
report fi'om anyone whom I know a statement to the contrary. Whose practice then do 
you have in mind when you disagree with the Sunnah of the Prophet which alone 
ought to be sufficient to refute that practice and [above that] you disagree with 'Umar 
also ... At the same time you fall back on practice. however we have not discovered to 
this very day what you mean by practice. Nor do I think we ever shall" 
(ShafieI 1983, vol. 7: 244). 
It is in reality the opinions of individual jurists that are called the practice and 
therefore there seems to be a continuous change in practice, because it is one 
more akin to personal opinion (raJy) than to a collective one of all the Medinese. 











Successor), above a Prophetic tradition, supposedly based on the practice of a 
group of people yet in other cases Malik does not share the opinion of al-Qasim 
and says he does not know who the 'people' are to whom al-Qasim refers. 
Modern scholars differ in their interpretations on Malik's - and earlier scholars' 
attitude vis - a - vis traditions Uzadith) and practice (Carnal). Apologists (such as 
J An?arI) argue that the obvious reason, for the Medinese not accepting a 
Prophetic tradition was their fear that some Companion(s) might express an 
opposing opinion or act contrary to the tradition which casts doubt on the 
authenticity of the ~adith e An~arI, 1991: 491). This is a stark assumption. If they 
were not convinced about the authenticity of a tradition from the Prophet then 
what would or could they be convinced about. 
Admirers, of that early living tradition (especially the practice of MadIna), such 
as Ya.sin Dutton argue that the MuwartaJ is essentially a book of (amal or, more 
precisely a book of ~adlth put into the context of Carnal. Malik was not so much 
concerned with the formal report (~adfth) in proportion to his concern with the 
correct understanding of such reports- )Ibn CUyaynah reportedly said that ~adfths 
are a source of misguidance (maejilla) except for the jilqahiP (Dutton, 1996: 28). 
Both accuracy of transmission and accurate understanding of the material were of 
vital importance, hence Jlbn MahdI's description of Malik as Jinuim in ~adith and 
Sunnah thus delineating these as separate concepts. If therefore Malik records a 
badlth yet gives a judgement "seemingly" to the contrary we have to assume that 











Malik, was stronger than ~zadlth; simply put (amal was a better indicator of 
sllnnah than ~1Qdfth (Dutton, 1996: 33-37). 
According to Dutton, this does not mean that (amal and fwdith are mutually 
exclusive, rather where they overlap as does happen they strongly confirm each 
other, but if there is a contradiction Malik and the Medinese prefer (amal over 
hadlth even if the sources of the ~zadlth are completely trustworthy. Dutton's 
expose, though very important, tells less than what is hoped in order to 
understand this phenomenon of (amal vs. hadfth in the genesis of Sunnah and as 
Lowry (date) comments is a historical. The early generations preferred (amal 
above Prophetic traditions, not because practice was a more certain indicator of 
Sunnah than hadith or that the spirit (jiqh) of these traditions - embodied by 
practice - mattered more. Rather their method was an inconsistent one as practice 
was many times based on the established opinions of individuals, especially the 
Caliphs and the governors in the provinces. 
How then do we explain 'kisha's "practice" of sending Salim to her sister 'Dmm 
Kulthum to be breastfed as she did not allow any man to call upon her until he 
had completed a minimum of five sucklings ten according to another 
contradictory report - by her sister(s) or nieces. CA)isha not only narrated this 
from the Prophet, but actually implemented it as practice; whether the Prophet's 
other wives disagreed was irrelevant. \\llat is prominent in this practice was not 











Dutton's claim that Malik was primarily more concerned with the fiqh of the 
badith is less than convincing. There was not, and need not be, necessarily an 
organic or natural link between the fiqh of the tradition and practice. But more 
importantly why the insistence by Malik to record solitary traditions that were 
redundant and overshadowed by practice? Is it because these traditions were 
initially the rational opinions or interpretations of individuals whether on 
Qur'anic verses or independent reasoning from the first two generations that did 
not become widespread practice (such as that of 'kisha) but had already by the 
second quarter of the second century or earlier been ascribed to the Prophet ~­
Malik started compiling the Muwa!!a) the late fourth decade of that century? 
If this is so, it stands to reason, that an earlier practice was given preference over 
individual interpretations that later were afforded the status of reliable "Prophetic 
traditions" conveyed via trustworthy sources. Or is it that the opinion of a certain 
individual(s), managed, over and above a tradition of the Prophet and a 
Companion or a Successor to become the widespread practiee? If it is so, what 
was the criterion for giving preference to the opinion of an individual Companion 
or Successor over an injunction of the Prophet, and for that particular individual 
opinion to become the practice? The reality is that there was no criterion. The 
living tradition exercise, as a whole, was inconsistent, arbitrary and political in 
other words on the level of state by the ruler as opposed to social on the level of 
individuals in society.8 It is precisely this lacunae and inconsistency that ShaficI 
hoped to bridge with his project. 











What is progressive of an opinion ~ if we accept that the breastfeeding tradition 
mentioned above was originally the interpretation of) A 'isha - that hold that an 
adult man be suckled by a married woman? Indeed, what is rational, medically 
and socially, about it and more so how is it religiously sensitive especially in light 
of Islam's strict rules regarding sexuality, chastity and its command to people to 
conceal their sexual parts (saw)at) from one another. 
Malik as a scrupulous and pious compiler of ~adlth could not reject any tradition 
whose sources were completely trustworthy. By the time he was compiling the 
Muwarra) the Ijadlth movement had already gained currency and increasing 
power over the living Sunnah. Malik found himself unable not to record, for 
example the breastfeeding ~adlth, ascribed to the Prophet, however illogical and 
contradictory it seemed to the Qur)an, the practice of the community, other ~adith 
Arab custom, and basic common sense. It was not simply up to him, as an 
individual endowed with personal piety and afiqh (correct understanding) of the 
traditions, to decide which traditions to record and which ones to discard. In 
principle, he was still committed to the rational living practice, but had to act 
within the boundaries of the prevalent political cum religious discourse with 
regard to the recording of "Prophetic" ~adfths. It was a discourse that regarded 
the opinions, interpretations and actions of the Companions above reproach. 
Many of their views that had by the mid second century become "Prophetic 
traditions" could not be contested as possible fabrications. But Malik finds an 
avenue of escape and that is whilst he records all these traditions he takes solace 











My aim is not to demonstrate that Malik was wrong - or right - in what he 
recorded in the MlH'Va!!a), but to point out the inconsistency with regards to how 
at times ~adlth is accepted to establish S'unnah and how at times it is summarily 
discarded. The same applies equally to practice. There was no criterion for 
accepting one practice over another practice in Madlna as there were at times 
several widespread practices that differed. 
5.2) ) Abu Yusuf YaCqub bin )IbrahIm (d.183 A.H.) 
) Abu Yusuf was born in Kufa in 1131731. He became the chief justice during the 
reign of Caliph al-MahdI. He wrote Kit{lh al-Khadij, a compendium of religious 
laws dealing with questions on the conduct of the state and administering the 
empire at the request of Caliph Hamn aI-RashId (Lambton. 1981). His book 
contained the Sunnahs of the Prophet, the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, cUmar b. 
(Abd al-cAzlz', the Companions, of the various Umayyad Caliphs, and the 
interpretations of the jurists. As he states: 
The Commander of the Faithful (May God strengthen him) asked me to compile an 
all-inclusive compendium dealing with the collection of land taxes (jihaya al-













5.2.1) Sunnah: Between Solitary Reports and Juristic 
Interpretati on 
By Sunnah )Abu Yusuf means the well-known Sunnah (al-Sunnah al-maCriifah) 
that is the established religious practice even if a relevant tradition cannot be 
shown for it. As a proponent of ra) he held that the qualified jurist well versed in 
law and possessed of a high degree of intelligence was allowed to freely develop 
the living Sunnah and contribute to its content through a situational treatment of 
the Prophetic Sunnah. For example he interprets the Prophet's treatment of the 
Muhiijiriin in returning to them their properties after the conquest of Makkah as 
an exception to the Sunnah and therefore this practice does not constitute Sunnah 
(Rahman, 1994: 13-29). He advocated the acceptance of only those ~adiths that 
were well known by the legal experts known as the collective spirit or nature of 
fwdlth and not solitary traditions, that is, a tradition transmitted by a single 
individual (khabr al-){i~iid). He rejected a solitary tradition as irregular (shiidh) 
because it was not well known to the legal experts and thus in his vie"v not in 
conformity with the Qur'an and the well-known Sunnah (Shafi'l, 1983, vol.7: 
358). 
The "rejection" of solitary ~adiths must be placed in perspective. The general 
view held by modern scholars of Islamic studies Western and Muslim - is that, 
prior to al-ShaficI, solitary badlths (khabr aPii~iid) were frowned upon and 
generally rejected.9 This view must be rejected as it is at odds with the historical 











times following the demise of the Prophet. Some Companions frequently cited 
solitary Prophetic ~adlths -despite the reports that the first four Caliphs were 
very stringent in the spread of ~adlths and demanded a witness when someone 
reported that the Prophet had something. ) Abu Bakr himself said to have burned 
500 ~adlths that he had heard from the Prophet indicative of his extreme caution 
rather his refusal to misrepresent the Prophet - cited solitary ~adiths. For 
examples he alone reported that he heard the Prophet saying that the Prophets do 
not leave inheritance what they leave behind is for all the people. (Umar accepted 
a solitary ~adith by SubayCah yet rejected a solitary one by Fa~ima bint Qays. 
CUthman and cAn frequently referred to fwdiths that, they alone heard from the 
Prophet. Thus solitary reports are not necessarily a 2nd century phenomenon and 
even less so opposed to, what RaJ).man and ) Abu Yusuf call, the well-known 
Sunnah. Rather I will venture to claim that the phenomenon of solitary reports 
precedes the reference to what became known as the well-known Sunnah, in 
seeking to substantiate legal and theologieal positions. 
If we accept that many solitary ~adfths, projected back to the Prophet, were in 
reality the legal and dogmatic views of first three generations arrived at through 
their free interpretation then it stands to reason, given the ancient schools' 
hostility to disagreement vvhy solitary ~adlths ~adfths (khabr aP[j~[jd) would be 
rejected. It was not so much the rejection of 'solitary' ~adlths that mayor may 
not have been uttered by the Prophet, as much as it \vas an aversion to 
disagreement. Hence Schacht's statement, that Shafi(I rightly connected the 
9 With Muslim I mean scholars who are regarded as Modernists such as Rahman, Tastant etc. and 












rejection of 'isolated traditions' by the ancient schools with their aversion to 
disagreement is viable (Schact, 1979). Specifically) Abu Yusuf who does not 
reject "solitary" hadlths because it has only one chain of narrators, but because it 
stands alone as a kind of exception to the general Sunnah, which probably refers 
to the living practice of a particular school whether it can be traced back to the 
Prophet or the Companions or not. 
)Abu Yusufs position lS, however, not consistent. On the issue of the share 
(sahm) to be allotted to a Muslim for his horse for taking part in the jihad apart 
from his own share ) Abu Yusuf opted for a solitary hadlth literally without 
interpreting it situationally as he did on other occasions. Osman Tastant describes 
this shift as the reversal of the rational orientated position of ) Abu ijanlfa 
symptomatic of 'Iraqi rationalism, to ShafiCite literalism (Tastan, u.d: 9-10). But 
was it a straightforward departure from rationalism to literalism as Tastant claims 
and from free human interpretation to the rigidity of text and obsession with legal 
fixity? 
The living Sunnah was so permeated with incoherencies and contradictions that 
rigidity, as a solution to the problem would be the natural outcome. Tastant, as 
much, gives us an indication of this reversal of rationalism by ) Abu yusuf. It was 
because of the relationship between law and politics, or that of law to politics. 
) Abu Yusuf, unlike) Abu ijanlfa who was a fierce opponent of the Umayyad State 
and equally distanced from the Abbasids aligned himself with government efforts 
to codify the law and took responsibility for legal administration as a prominent 











very early in the life of the Abbasid State. ) Abu Yusuf thus could not be as free as 
his teacher in exercising independent rationalism, free from state influence. The 
shift from rationalism gradually towards literalism was in essence a political one. 
And as Adonis says: "Every aspect of Arab life would be pivoted around the 
question ofleadership and politics (Adonis, 1983: 2). 
Conclusion 
From all this we conclude that the living Sunnah did not function as a coherent 
exercise that would ensure order. Any viable system or theory that aims at 
progress and stability - without proscribing interpretation - where justice IS 
pervasIve must have a coherent edifice and stable structure. As John Rawls 
argues: "A good theory of justice would explicate and systemize our intuitive 
sense of justice in the way that logic spells out our sense of validity ... " (Kukathas 
and Pettit, 1990: 7). It is precisely in this regard that the living Sunnah failed. It 
was characterized by a lack of order that allowed the same jurists to reject and 
accept solitary opinions; the "right" to free interpretation was limited to the 
regional (ancient) schools only. We saw Malik's-- and the Medinese school as a 
whole - view that all Muslims should follow the people of Madlnah. And we 
have seen how the situation being untenable as it was would play right into the 
hands of the political authority to move towards codification. It is here that 
Shatiey appears and argues that the entirety of law as residing in two texts, the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah; qiyas or Jijtihad remains subordinate to these two sources 













The Living Sunnah: As Lived Reality 
The best of you is my generation then those who follow them. 'Imran b. I:Iusayn 
said: I do not know whether the Nabf said after this [initial] word twice or thrice 
then after them [will come] people testifying whilst not asked to testify; they will 
betray and not be entrusted; they will make vows and not carry them out; and 
obesity will appear. 
(AI-Bukharl) 
History is the key to the [Muslim] intellect and the [political] authority is the key to 
history. 
(YilsTn, 1998: 8) 
In this Chapter I critically discuss the living Sunnah as an actual lived reality. 
This is done from two angles. One, from the perspective that the living Sunnah 
was shaped by politics and the political authority driven, many times, by motives 
not in line with the ethically based socio-political order of Islam, but in the 
service of personal, family and tribal interests. And two, its intellectual 
dimension that was arbitrary in nature and developed in the shadow of the 
political authority in a given historical milieu. Many religious dogmas and legal 
practices of that era were initially politically motivated and influenced - whether 
they were the decisions of the State or that of its political-religious antagonists. 
The scholars only followed later in justifying, modifying or refuting them. For 
example, David Powers points out a very direct and strong link bet\veen the laws 
on Inheritance and political succession with the ShI'a (Powers, 1986: 113-114). 
1) The Political Dimension 
Ral)man reads the first part of the hadith (epigram) as a clear attempt to declare 











generations, which is both intelligent and natural. The part from: "then falsehood 
will become rampant. .. " he describes, however, as a hopelessness that gave rise 
to "narrow religious" Messianism, which sees history as progressively 
deteriorating in order for a Messiah to come (Rahman, 1994: 111). RaDman 
misses the point completely. It was not Messianism at play, at least not as an 
intellectual and/or spiritual development but a conscious political endeavour to 
establish for the first three generations specifically the Companions an elite 
religious status and immunity for their legacy that was characterized by 
contradictions and interminable conflicts over power. 
To critically evaluate the first three generations specifically the Companions, to 
subject their community to a social analysis, and to view their differences and 
clashes as human was not permissible; rather it became a religious anathema. 
Their contradictions were declared as mere differences of understanding and 
interpretation, all pervaded by '>truth" CAbU Zayd, 1994: 45). Reading them 
through usual human lenses meant questioning or even casting doubt on the very 
authenticity of Islam, as they were the embodiment of that very authenticity. 
Hence the binary; the demarcation between them and all future generations who 
could not possibly, as a religious truth, enjoy the same pious status. The natural 
result had to be the inevitable ever-descending retrogression falsehood, 
betrayal, becoming fat (lazy), etc. of - future generations. In short this 
Messianism was essentially a political movement guised, however, in pietistic 
religious language. MabrUk aptly asks why in the explanation of the genesis of 
Islamic thought only the religious element has been highlighted whilst the 











has merit, but is historically misplaced. He embraces the poetics of the living 
Sunnah but shuns its politics completely. 
By deconstructing that movement we find that it signifies a political notion that 
regards the fulfilment of the best, as a given, achieved in an exclusive historical 
era (first three generations) that would henceforth, automatically and as a 
necessity, lead only to a future that collapses. I Consider the view that with 
<Umar's death nine tenths of knowledge "died" with him (CAbd al-Raziq, u.d: 
154). The link between the political authority and history is crystallised in a 
symbiotic relationship, through which the one establishes, and is established by, 
the other (Mabrilk, 2002: 11). Understanding this symbiotic relationship is 
necessary to understand the genesis and development of law Uiqh) historically in 
the Islamic State for, as cAbd al-Jawad says: 
The political authority has influentially performed a great deal in history whilst history 
impacted on the intellect directly and indirectly which resulted in the perpetual 
subjection of the Muslim intellect to both authority (by virtue of its history) and history 
(through its authority). The history of the authority caused this intellect to be almost 
completely obedient to government authority in the absolute sense whilst the authority of 
history ~ on this intellect has bequeathed it a semi-complete submission uncritically 
so to - the past in its absolute signification, as well 
(Yasln, 1998: 8). 
The Muslim intellect ~ religious and secular then lives and functions in what 
Fouad <AjamI calls, "the Pharaoh's shadow" «AjamI, 1983: 12). Submission to 
1 This notion is in essence that of the cAshcari political-historical religious discourse in terms of 












the political authority, the first condition for the practice of the law in Islam, is 
also the first step toward the complete renunciation of the self that one must 
achieve before reaching God (Massignon, 1982, 3: 188). The relationship between 
sharzCah (law) and siyasah (politics) was that of dualism; of the two competing 
systems of law and jurisdiction. Never did sharicah solely guide; rather there was 
a judicial practice based on a variety of laws derived from, amongst others, the 
sovereign decision of a ruler (MasCud, u.p: 2-4). Law is shaped and influenced by 
politics in that the Caliph sees himself not only as the deputy of God on earth but 
also as the propounder of law in its widest sense (I:IalHiq, 1997: 10). Only later 
does law assume a normative status and presents itself as a partner in an attempt 
to direct the relationship aiming to reflect as much as possible the ideals of that 
particular message. 
1.1) Politics before and at the tinle of Muhammad's Demise 
The political situation, just before and at the time of Muhammad's demise, had a 
definitive bearing on the making of history - and by extension the Muslim 
intellect after his demise. A J:!adUh in al-BukbarI highlights a major dispute that 
took place at the time of the Prophet's last sickness: 
On the authority of'Ibn <Abbas who said: "When the Prophet was on the point of death; 
his health deteriorating he said: 'Bring me writing materials and I shall dictate for you a 
document [of instructions] so that you will never go astray after it' ... 'Umar said: "Pain 
has overcome the Messenger of God and the Book of God is sufficient for us." Some of 
those present ... differed with 'Umar and a dispute arose ... [S]ome persons said: "Bring 
the writing materials .. ." Others supported cUmar. When ... the squabbling increased the 
Messenger of God said: "Get up and leave me. there should be no quarrelling in my 











preventing the Messenger of Allah trom writing the document". (AI-Bukhi.irl, 1982, vol 
2: 1) 
In the Musnad of Abmad )ibn ijambal it is reported that a women said: "Beware 
the testament (Cahd) of the Messenger of God" (Powers, 1986: 114; Jibn ijambal, 
1975: 754). A juxtaposed reading of the circumstances when JAbu Bakr dictated 
his political testament, to those when the Prophet asked for writing materials 
assuming that he wanted to dictate his political will reveals a serious discrepancy 
in the manner that both occasions, though quite similar, were dealt with. 
'AbO Bakr called 'Uthman aside and said. "Write: 'In the name of God. the Merciful 
the Compassionate'. This is what 'AbU Bakr b. 'Ab! Qa/.lafa bequeathed ('ahida i/d) to 
the Muslims. As for. what follows." [Mui)ammad b. 'Ibrahim b. al-f:Iarith] said: Then 
[)AbO BakrJ fainted and [<Uthman] moved away from him. 'Cthman \vrote, "As for 
what follows. I have appointed 'Umar b. al-Khanab as your Caliph, and there is none 
better for you than him." Then 'Abo Bakr regained consciousness and said, "Recite to 
me." So he recited to him. 'AbO Bakr said: "God is great!" and he said, "I think that you 
were afraid that the people would disagree had I died suddenly while unconscious." 
['Uthman] said, "Yes." 
(AI-Tabari, 1884. vol. 3: 356) 
Powers concludes that the similarities of both events lend support to the 
assumption that the Prophet sought to dictate a political testament in which he 
would nominate a successor (Powers, 1986: 115-119). Both the Prophet and) Abu 
Bakr were ill and on their death beds) Abu Bakr was literally out of his senses. 
)Abu Bakr used the term bequeathed (Cahida) ... " which reminds us of the 











classical Arabic, is frequently used to denote a succeSSIOn covenant - of the 
Messenger of God." And 'Abu Bakr's words to <Uthman "r think that you were 
afraid that the people would disagree had I died suddenly, .. " echo the Prophet's 
"Let me dictate ... so that no two men will disagree after me", 
Powers interprets those Companions' refusal to provide the Prophet with writing 
materials as indicative of their suspicion and fear of the prospect that he was 
drawing up a last political will and testament with the specific aim of appointing 
a successor. Interestingly, 'Ibn ijazm interprets the Prophet's wish to dictate a 
document, which CUmar refused to grant him, as the Prophet's intention to 
appoint, in writing, 'Abu Bakr as his successor. Can we read this refusal to grant 
the Prophet his request as an example product of the progressive 'living Sunnah'? 
Ral)man's notion is not - though it should be helpful in answering this question. 
This underlying political character of events hitherto is affirmed after 
Muhammad's death with the issue of his succession. No event in history has 
divided Islam more prof()Undly and durably than the succession to Muhammad 
which marked the first political rift that occurred in Islam (Tayobl MascudI, 1998: 
43; Madelung, 1997: 1). And as al-ShahrastanI said: "The greatest dispute (khiliij) 
between the Jummah [was] the dispute over political leadership eimiimah). For 
never has a sword in [the history of] Islam been unsheathed over a religious 
precept (qiiCidah diniyah) as it has been over leadership throughout all ages" (Al-
ShahrastanL ltd: 22). The possibility of conceptualizing the meaning of the 
succession of Muhammad appears quite difficult and unachievable except in light 











Muslims debated and fought over who would become the repository of legitimate 
authority after the Prophet; there were several candidates: the Prophet's tribe 
Quraysh, his family. close friends and Companions, any ruler, regardless of how 
he came to power, and the Muslim community at large (Abou el Fadl, 2001: 12)? 
Only in the second century did the shariCah emerge. as constructed, articulated, 
and represented by a specialized body of jurists to harness all these arguments 
into a coherent and systematic discourse (Abou el-Fadl, 2001: 12). 
2) The Demise of Muhammad and the Living Sunnah 
Immediately following the death of the Prophet, before his burial, the 
Companions in different groups met and exercised their interpretations as to what 
the nascent Muslim community had to do and how. The very first decision they 
took was at a gathering called SaqIfah BanI Sa(idah. 
2.1) SaqIfah BanI Sacidah: Election of the First Caliph 
A detailed analysis of SaqIfah BanI Sa(idah is of absolute importance, because 
not only was it the first event where the Jummah the (An~ar and three of the 
MuhajirUn- met and took a decision following the demise of the Prophet, it was, 
in my view, the major event in Muslim history that influenced, more than any 
other event, future developments. There the first leader was chosen to lead the 
nascent post-prophetic ummah. The event itself was marked by controversy and it 
2 ) AbO Bakr was elected first, through a special paying of allegiance followed by a genera! one. 
He in tum appointed 'Vmar to succeed him. On his deathbed. 'Vmar, nominated a six-man 
council from which (Uthman was chosen. 'Ali was chosen by popular and mass decision, 
Mu'awiyah assumed authority through military prowess (ghalabah) and then introduced dynastic 











became a backdrop for suggesting how the question of political leadership might 
be viewed and resolved (Tayob, 1998: 29). 
During "Umar's last pilgrimage (23/644) a man approached him and asked him 
how he would respond to someone who said that upon '(Umar's death he would 
swear allegiance to so-and-so (juliin), as happened at Saqlfah. On returning to 
Medina, (Umar addressed the Companions of the Prophet on the question of 
succession, specifically referring to )Abn Bakr's election at Saqlfah, saying: 
It has reached me that one of you has said: By God if'Umar b.al-Khanab was to die, I 
would swear allegiance to so-and-so. Let no one be seduced to saying: The oath of 
allegiance for' AbO Bakr was a falta, yet it succeeded. It was indeed so, but God has 
warded off its evil ... Whoever were to swear allegiance to any man without 
consultation (mashwara) among the Muslims, his oath of allegiance would be invalid 
and both of them would be subject to be killed. (Al-Tabarl, 1879: 445-446) 
'(Umar's appraisal of SaqIfah was that it was a necessary evil and that it was only 
divine intervention that saved it from being a down right disaster. (Umar seems to 
have had a propensity for evoking divine intervention when a rush decision was 
taken or when he hastily announced that he would do something but ended up not 
doing it. For example, he intended to disclose information regarding al-kaliila but 
the sudden appearance of a snake, he claimed, prevented him from doing so, 
which he interpreted as a sign of divine intervention (Powers, 1986: 38). 
Therefore he rejected it as an acceptable model for choosing his successor after 
his death or that of any future Caliph. The Saqlfah event compromised the 











political decision in the midst of a crisis (Tayob, 1998: 43). The matter was not 
decided initially on the basis of an all-inclusive consultation (shiirii), consisting 
of all Muslims. 
2.1.1) Various Claims for Leadership 
The ) An~ar argued that they were the Helpers who gave refuge, assistance and 
military protection to the Prophet. They believed in Allah and His messenger, 
whereas his own people rejected him for thirteen years and only a few from his 
clan (Quraysh) believed in Allah (Mabruk, 1993: 123). To Madelung, the ) An~ar 
only aimed at restoring control over their city and not aspiring to the leadership 
of the Muslim )ummah as a whole, as they expected the Muhajirun to return to 
Makkah after the Prophet's demise, having no longer any good reason to remain 
in Madinah (Madelung, 1997: 31). To IIisham JuCayt it was a tribal initiative; a 
separatist behaviour that did not take the )ummah as a whole into consideration 
but only the) Aws/Khazraj tribal binary and thus it aimed at avoiding Qurayshi 
hegemony (Ju'ayt, 1995: 34-35). 
) Abu Bakr, on behalf of the Muhajirun, argued that they were the first Muslims 
and hence people ('An~ar) should follow them to be second to them politically 
as they were second in embracing Islam. They are the clan of the Prophet, the 
most central among the Arabs in lineage and abode, and its lineage alone is found 
in all tribes ('Ibn Qutayba, 1990: 23). 
) Abu Bakr's argument in essence was based on tribalism and tribal power 











reference to religion was purely strategic, as it could not count as a religious 
merit. As Dabshi says, ) Abu Bakr's election was legitimated by the tribal council 
at Saqlfah and by his prominence in the Quraysh tribe, and so his pious 
personality and close companionship to the Prophet played no significant role 
(Dabashi, 1989: 10). (Umar was unapologetic: the political succession to 
Mul;tammad was the right of Quraysh only; the )An5ar want to cut them off from 
their origin by usurping the decree to rule (Adonis, 1983: 120). Banu Hashim 
represented by (All, argued for the caliphate by virtue of not only being from 
Quraysh )Abu Bakr's argument but equally by virtue of belonging to the 
Prophet's household (Ahl I-Ba.v!) , who has the first and greater right to the 
Messenger of Allah, in his life and death. 
The choice, however, fell on those who exercised authority in the days before 
Islam. And as Max Weber says: "Authority will be called traditional if legitimacy 
is claimed for it and believed in by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and 
powers. The masters are designated according to traditional rules and are obeyed 
because of their traditional status" (Weber, 1978a: 67, Dabashi, 1989: 17). )Abu 
Bakr and (Umar were both ministers in the pre-Islam aristocratic government of 
Quraysh (Mabruk, 1993: 127). 'fhe Meccan merchant class. anxious to resume 
what Weber called the routine economic life, was an important element of) Abu 
Bakr's constituency (Dabashi, 1989: 4), (Ali: came from a clan that historically 
occupied the bottom step of the socio-economic ladder, hence his constituency 
was made up mostly of the socially marginalized, slaves, outsiders and exiles 











they were the ones who refused to pay allegiance to )Abn Bakr (Mabrilk, 1993: 
128-135). 
Saqlfah transcended its constituent personalities and their individual piety (the 
)An~ar, )Abu Bakr, (Umar, etc.) as merely moments in the movement of history 
that in its completion represents a type of divergence from the overall aim of 
Islam (Mabrilk, 1993: 128). Henceforth the caliphate was decided on a variety of 
questionable ways that were all religiously legitimized later; personal nomination 
of one or a specific number of people, military power and hereditary rule, etc. 
were limited to certain clans in Quraysh such as the )Umayyads and (Abbasids 
(Ju(ay~: 1995: 37). Sunni Islam as a political doctrine came to be concerned less 
with the constitution of legitimate political authority than with the more or less 
indiscriminate recognition of the fact of political power (Crone and Cook, 
1980: 124). Power then, as Nietzsche said, is the pivotal aspect and the only real 
value for the advancement of life; every power draws its ultimate consequence at 
moment (Makkreel, 1999: 560-562).3 The power of ideas is often 
understood not in terms of their moral force but just because of the advantages 
they seem to bestow on people regardless of their moral outlook, or even whether 
they have a moral outlook at all (Taylor, 1991: 20-21). 
At Saqlfah, the tribe (qahlfah), with its emphasis on social status, lineage, group 
loyalty, and customs of implacable, reckless temper, was chosen over direction 
(qiblah), with its emphasis on belonging to a nation united in its belief in one 
God and human egalitarianism (Al-(A~Iyyah, 1999: vo1.16: 88). Given the 
Although Nietzsche was not speaking in this context of political power assumed through brute 
force or despotism - he was rather arguing against what he called Christianity's slave morality I 
think it is yet possible to apply his ideas on power and morality to the context of political 











profound influence of the intellectual upon the material, the Qur)an sought very 
early on in its revelation to put an end to the cultural effect of the tribal system. 
\\Inat happened at SaqIfah, though, revived that very tribalism that became rooted 
in the cultural structures of Arab-Muslim societies, reflecting the propensity of 
Bedounism to be reshaped within various and different contexts. Qabflah is 
ultimately antithetical to qiblah (Dabashi, 1989: 76). For )Ibn Khaldi1n, SaqIfah 
was the manifestation of (a~ahiyyah (group loyalty) whereby only Quraysh could 
assume political and as such religious power: 
All religious laws must have purposes and significant meanings of their own ... [f we, 
now, investigate the wisdom of Qurashite descent as a condition [of the imamate] .,. 
[T]here must be a [public] interest which was the purpose behind making it into law. If 
we probe into the matter and analyze it we find that the [public] interest is nothing else 
but regard for the group loyalty (a[Ja:)abTyvah) [Group loyalty] gives protection and 
helps people to press their claims. Its existence frees the incumbent in the position [of 
'imamJ from opposition and division, The Muslim community accepts him .. , Now the 
Quraysh were the outstanding, original and superior leaders of the Mu<;lar their number, 
their group loyalty, and their nobility gave them power over the rest of the Mu<;lar hence 
all other Arabs acknowledged that fact and submitted to their superiority. Had the rule 
been entrusted to anybody else, it may be expected that their opposition and refusal to 
submit would have broken the whole thing up. 
(,Ibn Khald[m, 1988: 244-245) 
SaqIfah, in our view, failed the moral imperative of qiblah. It compromised the 
egalitarian ideal of Islam, as a political event had profound religious implications 
historically. A long term religious implication was that ) Abu Bakr's (as a 
Qurashite) election at Saqlfah, which was a response to a political reality (the 











siyasiYlIn) 'Ibn KhaldUn's notion ofca.yahiyyah - and finally a binding political-
religious text (na~~ siyaslyun) - that is a ~adith (Yasln, 1998: Henceforth 
various radically different interpretations would qualify) AbU Bakr's election at 
SaqIfah. For the Sunni orthodoxy represented by the prominent traditionist al-
BukharI (d. 256), his selection was based on a religious judgement of the Prophet 
(Tayob, 1998: 48-54). Basan al-Ba~rI (d. 110) places )Abu Bakr as the explicitly 
designated and indicated successor (na~',v .fall wa )isharah) of the Prophet as he 
was the only witness to the miCraj (Massignon. 1982, 3: 193). On the other hand 
the historian aI-TabarI and Jahiz the literary figure show) AbU Bakr's selection as 
a pragmatic, rational and political decision of innovative excellence (Tayob, 
1998: 54). 
3) Other Illustrations of the Living Sunnah: (Umar's Reign 
Subsequent to Saqlfah many other decisions of an essentially political character 
were taken that we could read and we ought to be able to read as products of the 
living Sunnah experience. Since Ral;man only discusses decisions of CUmar 
(when he was Caliph) as illustrious examples of the living Sunned?, during the era 
of the Companions, I too will look at other decisions ofcUmar only and critically 
evaluate them as illustrations of the living Sunnah. I will, though, discuss 
political examples of the living Sunnah from the era of the Successors. My aim is 
to read all these examples in the light of the QurJanic moral imperative that 











3.1 ) The Expulsion of Banu N ajran and Arab Identity 
<Umar, in the interest of socia-economic justice, decided not to distribute the 
conquered lands of (Iraq among the Muslim soldiery, as some soldiers would 
have expected, in accordance with an old law of war and how the Prophet had 
distributed the booty during his lifetime. That was indeed a moral and progressive 
decision motivated by considerations of socio-economic justice. 
How though should CUmar's forced removal of the Christian tribe BanO Najran 
from tbeir native land in Najran be described CAbO YOsuf, 1885: 73)? In the first 
case he feared that such a move would displace and dispossess the original 
inhabitants as well as neglect the world population and future Muslim 
generations. What was the ostensible reason for the removal of BanO Najran? 
Were they a threat to the security of Muslims? Unlikely so, and even if they were 
as CVmar apparently feared the Islamic state was at that stage firmly established 
and strong (Egypt, the Persian and Byzantine empires had just been, or were on 
the brink of being conquered). 
The reality is that cVmar largely identified Islam with Arabs as the natural 
identity for the Arabs, and he wanted only one religion (ethnic identity) to prevail 
in the Arabian Peninsula. A singular ideological force born and bred by them in 
the Arabian Peninsula should unite the Arabs; that force was Islam. BanO Najran 
refused to abandon their Christian faith. Whether they were removed because 











sent to cIraq, the land of the (ajam (non-Arabs), is a matter of speculation.4 What 
does seem clear are two things: one. CUmar's inconsistency in not wanting to 
displace people from their homeland (the case of cIraq) whilst removing them 
from their home in another instance; and two, his decision to deport BanD Najran 
was in essence driven by ethnic interests. It will now also make sense to suggest 
that another reason (not primary, yet significant) why CUmar refused to distribute 
the conquered lands of 'Iraq among the soldiery, i.e. Arab soldiers, was that he 
feared that upon becoming land-settlers they would cease to be fighters and mix 
among the local non-Arab population. 
A further indication of "Umar's notion of Islam as essentially the national Arab 
identity is that when the Arab Christian tribe BanD Tighlab refused to discharge 
the poll-tax (jizyah) asjizyah on the grounds that it was a tax for the (ajam (non-
Arabs), he did not object. Rather, they were prepared to discharge zakiih - as the 
Arabs (Muslims) did - a suggestion CUmar refused, explaining that zakah was a 
duty obligatory on Muslims only; however, he allowed them, on their suggestion, 
to discharge twice the amount that Muslims discharge for zakah, in the name of 
zakiih, not in the name ofjizyah. Hence he commanded Ziyad b. IJuc;layr (a zakiih 
collector) to take double zakiih from BanD Taghlib, as they were Arab and not 
People of the Book even though they were Christian. In doing so cUmar 
emphasized BanD Taghlib's Arab ethnicity, ignoring in the process their religious 
belonging - as he hoped perhaps someday they would become Muslim (the 
4 In our current world, where experiences such as Apartheid rule in South Africa, the Zionist 
occupation of Palestine and its forced removals of Palestinians in 1948 with subsequent 
deportations of resistance figures, etc. are condemned as violations of human rights, how will the 
removal of BanD Najran from their ancestral home be classified? How will it be regarded in light 
of what Rabman - and indeed all Muslims believes to be the basic elan of the QUr'an: the stress 











natural Arab identity). He therefore stipulated that Banu Taghlib not let their 
children grow up as Christian - the natural assumption would be that these 
children would be Muslim, as the Arab identity demanded CAbu Yusuf, 1885: 
135). 
3.2) Six Cases of Social-Legal Legislation 
CUmar proscribed the sale or gifting of )umm walad (a slave girl who bore her 
master a child) during the master's life, and her retention as a slave after his 
death, and he laid down a strict code for the giving of testimony (RaDman, 1994: 
179-188). These decrees were indeed progressive and moral; however, we 
juxtapose them to the following four decrees of CUmar in order to gauge their 
moral and progressive character. 
One, his wish to proscribe women from attending congregational prayers at the 
mosque though the Prophet had said: "Do not prevent God's female consorts 
from [attending] God's mosques. Two, he alone was of the view (narrating a 
solitary ~adlth) that stoning non-virgin adulterers to death was originally a verse 
in the Qur)an. Interestingly, RaDman totally rejects stoning to death for adultery 
and refers to the seventh/thirteenth century scholar cIzz aI-DIn )ibn CAbd aI-Salam 
al-SulamI who apparently rejected it as well, declaring the entire traditional 
material on the issue utterly unreliable (Rabman, 1982: 30; al-Sulami, u.d: 149-
163). Three, he banished Na~r b. I:Iajjaj, said to have been a strikingly handsome 
young man, from his family home in MadInah to Ba~ra; his reason, Na~r's 
handsomeness was an avenue of seduction (jitnah) for the women of MadInah 











handsomeness would not seduce the women of Ba~rah? And four, his decree to 
have the necks of the ahl Cl dhimmah (free non-Muslim subjects in the ancient 
Islamic state) stamped after the poll-tax has been taken and to force them to wear 
a separate dress to distinguish them from Muslims (such as placing a sash on 
their waist). 
It is difficult to see how these four examples can be counted as progressive. But 
that is the living Sunnah exercise: undefined, incoherent (both progressive and 
retrogressive), arbitrary and enacted not organically but on the level of State. 
4) The Successors: The Political Authority 
The political authority during the era of the Successors played no less a 
significant role then the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (AI-KhulaftP al-Rashidiln) 
in the make up of the living Sunnah. In fact one can argue that their role was 
significantly greater then that of their earlier counterparts. 
4.1) Umavyad Rule And Theistic Determination 
Theistic predetermination was the official "religious" doctrine for the greater part 
of Umayyad rule. cAbd ai-Malik b. Marwan killed his designated successor (Amr 
b. Sa(ld as per the decree of God. Diametrically opposed to this view was that of 
the scholar ijasan al-Ba~ri's in favour of human freedom (Ral,1man, 1966: 48). To 
ijasan the behaviour of the Prophet and his Companions' behaviour although 
there was no actual transmission (~adlth) has shown to be that of human freedom. 











able to make their respective interpretations in favour or against human freedom. 
<Abd aI-Malik, in the absence of a ~wdlth, refuted on the basis of raJy I~asan's 
view. \\Inen he asked Uasan for a transmission he was not in as much asking for a 
Tradition in proportion to him aiming at refuting al-Ba~ri' s opinion on the basis 
of it lacking official religious sanction (a transmission); his point was that al-
Ba~ri's interpretation had no preference over his. Needles to say that he could do 
that because he was the ruler and his view triumphed in the end. 
And because there was no such literal tradition it was a mere matter of opinion, 
which only the political authority could decide on. And ra)y, as )Ibn al-Muqaffa< 
d. 142) said, is the prerogative of the political authority alone (Lambton, 
1981 :52). Towards its end the Umayyad State radically shifts from theistic 
determination to human freedom at the hands of Yazld III and Marwan II (the last 
Umayyad Caliph). Some of the early MuCtazilites (rationalists) were aligned to 
these Caliphs, just as they would become during the reigns the cAbbasid Caliphs 
aI-Ma)miln, al-Mu<ta~im and al-Wathiq (198/814 to 234/850). Why this 
turnabout? It seems that the Umayyad State could no longer depend on a political 
theology that allowed it to ascribe everything to divine determination. In our 
view, Ral)man fails to comprehend that it was to a great extent though not 
entirely political developments that motivated the interpretations of the early 
generations. 
4.2) Abbasid Rule and Theocracy 
)Abu JaCfar al-Man~ur, the second Abbasid Caliph, held that God appointed him 











of God's treasures and is responsible, with God's permission, for its distribution 
to the people. Through him God distributes abundantly. or holds back on, His 
treasurers (Musa, 1995: 140). People, therefore, could not oppose or be critical of 
him. AI-Man~ilr, in coming to this position, depended on no ~adlth; it '.vas a 
rational decision whether we think it progressive or not is beside the point - a 
political one that is; an undefined living Sunnah allowed him such interpretation. 
Once again he was the ruler. 
5) The Intellectual Authority 
Many of the early jurists, Ral)man says, added, through progreSSIve 
interpretation, to the richness of the content of Sunnah. However it needs to be 
pointed out that some of their interpretations were not purely intellectually 
inspired or organic. For example) Abu Yusuf ruled, despite a direct Prophetic 
injunction that gold must be sold by weight (wazn) and not by measurement 
(ka~v!), that gold could be sold by measurement in accordance to the practice 
(Cur!> of the merchants of his time. He allowed this because otherwise the 
prevailing commercial practice of paying for merchandise in the form of gold 
pieces would not be permitted, unless each gold piece was precisely weighed due 
to the disparity of weight found in many types of gold coins (Moosagie, u.p: 48-
50). Two points need to be raised here: one, the disparity in the weight of many 
types of gold coins minted by different Sultans is indicative of rival political 
forces as by minting their own coins, different in weight to that of others, they 
were entrenching their political authority economically; and two, the practice of 
the merchants was in response to political development and not as the result of a 











against the Prophetic injunction in an effort to rehabilitate a practice that arose 
not organically in society but as the decree of Sultans. 
Moosagie considers this as a striking example of the disparity between legal 
theory and practice, remarking that in orthodox legal theory there is no way to 
justify such a ruling that contradicts a conspicuous injunction based on nass 
(Moosagie, U.p: 50). Moosagie misses the point: firstly in ) Abu Yusuf's time 
there was not as yet any coherent legal theory. Practice was the order of the day, 
but it was a practice marked by inconsistency and that governors and political 
authorities many times introduce. An incident from involving MuCawiya b. )AbI 
Sufyan substantiates the point we trying to make. ShafiCI reports in the Risalah, 
that MuCawiyah sold a water bag made of gold or silver for more than its weight, 
)Abu Darda) (a Companion of the Prophet) informed him that the Prophet forbade 
this kind of transaction. MuCawiyah replied that he saw no problem with the 
transaction. ) Abu Darda) protested against MuCawiyah, who in spite of being 
informed of the Prophet's ruling follows his own opinion (ShaficI, 1979: 98). 
Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that living Sunnah - in both its 
political and intellectual dimensions - was characterized by inconsistencies and a 











political-intellectual opposition. True, the examples chosen were only a fraction 
of living Sunnah practice as it unfolded over that first three generations. 
However, they are sufficient, to give us a general and informed understanding of 
how the early generations especially the Companions crystallized their 
theological beliefs and legal practices. As for the claim of inconsistency it sought 
to critically question (or even cast doubt) on the progressiveness or rationality of 
some decisions. Here RaDman's description of Islam as an ethical order under 
taw}:zid, whereby morals could not be made and unmade at the will of man, was 
employed as a methodology to appraise these practices. Indeed there were 
examples that were progressive and truly revolutionary (for example, some of 
'CUmar's decisions), but it is precisely here that the paradox lies. For, whilst some 
decisions were characterized by progressiveness, in nature and content, some 
others were destructive from the onset and more so those that bequeathed a 
horrible legacy to future generations. 
On accusmg the living Sunnah of being in essence the product of political 
authority this chapter sought to highlight a stark omission, in RaDman's romantic 
account and as such his celebration of the living Sunnah, that is, the political 
element In this regard I employed 'All MabrLik's methodology to highlight 
exactly the primary role played by politics and its movement. So then what we 
lament is the total absence and lack of a coherent moral framework that would 
have enabled not only those very generations of the living Sunnah of the tlrst one 
hundred and fifty years but also the subsequent ones, to deal with the 
discrepancies. In the absence of that moral-intellectual-scientific framework the 
political establishment ran amok at a pace with which the religious-intellectual 











It is in this context that Mul).ammad b. )IdrIs al-Shafi'I starts his program in 
search of uniformity and a methodologically defined law system. In the Risiilah 
he, as Joseph Lowry argues, articulates the core idea of the hayiin, which in 
summary means that the entirety of law resides in two texts, the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah. Shafi(! attempts therein to set forth a comprehensive account of the 












Who's Authority: The Political or the Religious-Intellectual? 
Obey God, obey the Messenger and the authority from amongst you (lib ai-amr) 
(Qur'an 4:59) 
God restrains through the ruler what he does not restrain through the Qur)an. 
(AI-SaghTr. 1994: 154) 
Islam has, undoubtedly, produced a great religious-cultural legacy and intellectual 
tradition. This chapter probes whether this legacy is, and to what extent, the 
construct of pure intellectual activity or that of political rule or of both - the two, in 
our view, are not necessarily mutually exclusive practices. l In other words, to what 
extent does this legacy represent the Islamic epistemology that dictates that 
knowledge (the pre-requisite for any enlightened humanistic tradition) must be the 
product of revelation and the human intellect? With human intellect we mean the 
natural disposition tabfifrah) and ability of the Muslim human being to realize 
through knowledge his or her existence ontologically and decide his or her destiny in 
line with the Islamic 1+'cltanschauung, without any outside and artificial imposition. 
This question of whether it was the political authority (the rulers) or the intellectual-
religious authority (the scholars) that impacted more decisively on the religious 
legacy, is indispensable and paramount. It allows and helps us to understand, 
I There were rulers who possessed knowledge to qualify them as scholars. 'Abd-Allah b. 'Umar 
described 'Abd ai-Malik b. Marwan as one of the most knowledgeable youth of Quraysh in badlth and 
on the verdicts of the Companions (al-SuyDP, 1982: 254). Malik b. Anas found 'AbD ]a'far al-Man:;;iIr 
the most learned on the biographies of the predecessors and the most knowledgeable on the consensus 












throughout the ages, the dominant religious discourse specifically in the context of a 
diverse legacy bequeathed by the theological sects. 
It is the contention of this chapter that it was essentially the political authority and its 
political practice whether good or bad that impacted on the nascent religious 
discourse that emerged during the first centuries of Islam. What we had was a 
politicization of epistemological questions. In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate that 
the political authority played such a seminal - though not exclusive - role in a way 
that Muslim epistemology was somewhat distorted to become what we may call a 
political episteme, which has a rather pejorative connotation. However, this does 
not mean that the intellectual authority did not have or create its own sphere of 
influence. To conclude that the political rulers enjoyed exclusive authority because 
of their possession of povverful resources - military, finances, force etc. is 
problematic because it renders authority synonymous with force and possibly 
violence. 
1) Authority 
Hannah Arendt describes authority in the context of other phenomena such as 
violence, force, power etc. - as the most elusive of these phenomena and therefore 
the most frequently abused. Authority, whether vested in persons, in offices, etc., 
means unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion 
nor persuasion is needed (Arendt, 1969: 43-45). There is a difference between 
authority as an existential given and authority as brute force. Sherman Jackson states: 











figure has the right to be obeyed. Power ... relates to the ability to force obedience 
regardless of what is believed concerning the power-wielder's right to be obeyed ... 
there is an intimate association between power and authority, the relationship 
between the two being dialectical and often confluent" (Jackson, 1996: xxiv). The 
philosopher-sage, whilst not exercising political power in a temporal manner, 
nevertheless possesses authority to analyse, evaluate and develop a critical discourse 
capable of influencing and directing public opinion. 
Khalid Abou el-Fadl distinguishes between two types of authority. One, where there 
is "an authority" that is able to persuade so that the one who accepts him or her as an 
authority does so with the trust that he or she can explain the reasoning behind a 
certain decision, analysis, utterance or instruction. And two, where there is a person 
(one who possesses authority) "in authority"; he or she resorts to coercion employing 
a variety of methods, in this context unbecoming, to effect compliance with his or 
her commands. In this case one who accepts authority will in reality effect a 
complete surrender of judgment to the one in authority which is in fact domination, 
and not authoritativeness, at play (Abou el-Fadl, 200 I: 18-23). 
1.1) The Scholar: Actual Possessor of Authority? 
Plato was arguably the first ancient who articulated the ambition of the philosopher-
the model human being; possessor of knowledge to enjoy the exclusive possession 
of authority in exclusion of even the political man who simply wields authority by 
virtue of brute force. The ruler and planner of the Republic, Plato argued, must be a 











requisite for the person who wishes to be a possessor of political authority. The just 
society vying for the virtuous city will never be realized unless ruled by kings 
becoming philosophers or men who are philosophers cum kings (Wolff, 1996: 74). 
Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power 
of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one ... cities will never have rest 
from their evils, - no, nor the human race ... and then only will our State have a possibility of 
life and behold the light of day. (Plato, 1941: 171-175) 
) Abu I:Iamid al-Ghazaii (d. 1 11 I) sees that pol itics are exercised by four classes, of 
which the intellectual polity (al-hukama') is the third. The men of this class are the 
heirs of the prophets (the first class) and have jurisdiction over the thoughts of the 
privileged few, as opposed to the civil polity of the rulers (the second class) who 
enjoy jurisdiction over the actions, but not the thoughts, of the privileged few and the 
common folk (al-Ghazall, 1962: 28). It was As 'AbU 'Aswad al-Du'all who said that 
kings rule over people while scholars rule over kings (,Ibn cAbd Rabihl 1940: 70). 
Plato, though, came to realize that there is no guarantee that the philosopher-king 
will rule the world. For the greater part of human history it was the wielder of 
political power, obtained and sllstained through brute force (qCtl1'wah al-taghalluh) 
that steered, decided the perimeters, and determined the pace of the relationship 
between the two "authorities", Plato therefore hoped that the kings and princes of 
this world would have the spirit and power of phi losophy or at least the wish to be 











and Alexander the Great of Macedonia, ruler of Greece. Alexander was not a 
philosopher but merely interested in, and a patron of, philosophy. 
Behind all this discussion the crucial issue that remains to be asked of the Muslim 
experience is: Who practices authority over whom, in other words, who rules whom? 
Was it the scholar whose exercise of authority was the primary mover of events and 
developments in Muslim History, or was it the political ruler or perhaps both? 
Muslim scholars have argued that the Qur)an delineates the proper dynamics of 
authority. In this regard they have frequently invoked Qur)an 4: 59, \vhich states: 
"Obey God, obey the Messenger and the authority from amongst you Cull C I >amr) 
... " Obedience to God and the Prophet is clearly understood although it seems to 
have become a cliched belief, for in its application there seems to be an ambiguity 
precisely from the perspective of the political authority. As for who is meant by "'the 
authority from amongst you", the scope of obedience that an authority wields, and 
the extent of that authority in relation to that of God and the Prophet over it, has been 
a point of contention ever since. Scholars have for centuries grappled and still 
grapple with this issue. 
The prodigious tradition of Qur)an ic exegesis ((ilm al-tafsfr) is indeed a helpful but 
by no means exclusive starting point to explore what is meant by )ul[ "I >amr. 
Exegesis involves a focus on developing rules for deciphering the meaning of the 











(taJ}vfl), a lively process, revolving around the Qur)anic text, and of exploring the 
contemporaneous significance of the original meaning (Abou el-Fadl, 200): 118). 
A recurring interpretation is that Jull c/ Jaml". refers at the same time and equally to 
the rulers (aPlIInariP) , the jurists (al-fuqahip) and the commanders of military 
expeditions (al-saraya) during the life of the Prophet (al-ZamakhsharI, 1977, vol. 1: 
535; al-TabarI 1986: 150-154; al-Shawkanl, 1983: 481). The JumaraJ because they 
exercise actual political power (ahl 'I yadd wa 'I qudrah) and the (li/ama) because 
they give religious-intellectual guidance (ahl 'I (ifm wa ''/ kalam); therefore the 
people have entrusted them with the planning and running of their affairs and 
empowered them to issue commands and directives (al-Qasiml, u.d, Vol. 5: 1340-
1345). Thus from the Caliph to the administrator of public behaviour (wall al-
~isbah), the commanders of the armies, the knowledgeable jurists and the (ahl 'I f:zilt 
wa '[ (aqd) all are regarded as Jull 'I Jam,. elbn (Ashur, 1984: 97-98; aPAlOsI, 1985, 
vol.5: 65-66; al-ShawkanI, 1983: 481). 
Specifically with regard to the authority of scholars, three verses are often cited. The 
first rebukes the in this verse, Jewish - scholars (al-rabbanf}'yiln and aPaf:zbar) for 
not prohibiting people from uttering sin and devouring ill-gotten property. The 
second commands people to ask those with knowledge (ahl 'I dhikr) - arguably the 
scholars - if they do not know. And the third exhorts people to refer the issue of fear 











are the )uti ''/ Jamr, and not the rulers because they are mostly ignorant and of 
aggressive nature (al-Ja~~a~ u.d, vol.2: 451-452; al-AlnsI, 1985, vol.5: 65-66). 
Thus whilst authority in Islam rests ultimately \vith God (the Qur)an) and the Prophet 
(the Sunnah), in a very real and immanent manner, it has come to be identified, 
progressively becoming exclusively so, primarily with the political authority and to 
some extent with the religious authority as "parallel" authorities. [that "parallel" 
authority is primarily represented] Having earned its religious legitimacy and 
reached its maturity in this vein, by the first three generations who came to be 
identified under the term "the pious predecessors" (al-salaf al-:;iiliM. This is a vague 
term which according to cAbd al-Jawad YasIn lacks accuracy and definition, and as 
an independent source of law could and in fact at times did contradict the sharf'ah 
(YasTn, 1998: 17). 
CAll b. )AbT Talib's answer to the Khiirijite slogan "judgment is only for Allah", as 
stated in the Qur)an, sheds light on that reality. The Qur)an, 'Ali said, is written in 
straight lines between two covers and it does not speak for itself but rather it is men 
who speak in its name; the Qur)an needs interpreters and interpreters are men. With 
exegesis and interpretation, as Greifenhagen has shown in the dissemination of the 
Joseph story, the boundaries of meaning constructed by exegetes (mu/asirun) are 
ever again breached, allowing the "stuff' of the text to flow in other directions and to 
be constituted anew ideologically (Greifenhagen, u.p: I 16). And, ideology, as 
Jameson said, is a "strategy of containment", which allows what can be thought to 











lies beyond its boundaries that is always ever again breached (Jameson, 1981: 53). 
That the Sunnah of the Prophet too would be open to interpretation specifically 
from the political dimension was a reality that cannot be disputed. 
2) Relationship between the Scholar and the Ruler 
There has always been in the history of Islam a relationship between the scholars and 
the rulers. Scholars, though, differed in their relationship with the political authority; 
a particular scholar would establish and conduct his relationship in accordance to his 
belief that he should and was able to advise the political ruler to rule in accordance 
with the laws of the sharl(ah. Those who associated with the Caliphs did not see 
themselves as betraying their trusts (aI-Sabin 1985: 213).2 Ranging from 
unconditional support, to cautious collaboration, and finally to total antagonism we 
can broadly identify three strands of relationship between the scholars and the 
political authority from the replies of three scholars. 
The replies of Malik b. )Anas, )Ibn Sam(an and )lbn )AbI Dhu)ayb, to a question from 
the Caliph )Abu Ja<far al-Man~Or, reveal the radically different positions that the 
scholars had adopted vis-a-vis the political ruler. He asked them: "What kind of man 
(read political-religious leader) am I according to you; am I ajust ruler or unjust?" 
Malik replied: "0 Commander of the Faithful I beseech you by God and I plead to 
you through [the Prophet] Muhammad and by virtue of your kinship ties to him, to 
1 
k For example, al-Zuhrl, who's piety and reliable knowledge of hadith was well-known, based his 
support for some of the official views of the Umayyad state in keeping with the spirit of Islam 











excuse me from speaking on this matter". 'Ibn SamCan replied: "You [0 Commander 
of the Faithful] by God, are the best of men, you do the bajj (pilgrimage), you 
combat the enemy (of Islam], you secure the highways, you protect the weak from 
being devoured by the strong, through you religion is made firm and therefore you 
are the best of men and the most just of rulers." Replied 'Ibn 'Abi Dhu'ayb: "You (al-
Man~nr) are, by God, the worst person I know: you have selfishly appropriated the 
wealth of God and His Messenger: that is the wealth of the [Prophet's] next of kin, 
orphans, the needy; you have destroyed the weak, exhausted the strong and seized 
their wealth; what then is your excuse the day when you face God?" (,Ibn Qutayba, 
1990, vol. 2: J 96) 
The three replies explicitly and implicitly - reveal the scholars' awareness that they 
were dealing with a power in authority that tolerated no dissension. It depended first 
and foremost on brute force, and on very little of anything else, least so on 
knowledge and wisdom that the scholars boasted. Malik's reply represents the 
position of most scholars throughout the ages even though they did not regard the 
State as just - al-Man~nr's straightforward question left no room for a nuanced 
answer; it is therefore not difficult to link Malik's "inability" to answer to his 
pol itieal appraisal of the State in that he nevertheless recogn ized its legitimacy and 
worked with it. 'Ibn Samcan's position whether born out of a desire to flatter, fear of 
death, religious conviction, or political judgment is that of a religious "authority" 
that had completely capitulated to the political authority; where the ruler is quasi 
similar to God. This notion of similarity implies a discrepancy between the rest of 











Spinoza tells us that in times gone by: ..... kings ... have often endeavoured to 
persuade the world that they had derived their origin from the immortal gods. If their 
subjects regarded them not as mortals I ike themselves, but as gods, they would more 
readily suffer themselves to be ruled, and prove more submissive in all things" 
(Spinoza, 1862: 291).3 )Ibn )AbI Dhu'ayb's position - the exception to the rule IS 
one that is characteristically confrontational and antagonistic. 
The question then that arises is what was the extent of the scholar's authority vis-a-
vis the ruler and his power? Was he able to influence and direct religious and socio-
pol itical discourse in the public domain in a manner that the actual wielders of 
political power could not. The scholar undoubtedly possessed authority to critically 
evaluate both the state and society as well influence public opinion. It was not, 
however, authority that posed an immediate threat or was a rival power to the 
political ruler. Lacking the ability, resources and even the desire, it seems, to remove 
or replace the pol itical authority they harnessed their authority in the religious-
intellectual domain in a way that precluded any direct interference in, or contact 
with, the state. AI-JabartI tells us that when the French occupation withdrew from 
Egypt in 1801, they wanted to hand over political authority to the 'ulama, who 
promptly refused (Crecel ius, 1980: 49-70). 
~ Muslim rulers off course never claimed that they were of divine descent. There was, however, a 
move towards a situation where rulers were increasingly seeing themselves as God's representatives 
on earth, hence their dissimilarity to the rest of humanity. When Mu'awiyah b. )AbI Sufyan appointed 
his son, Yazld as his successor he declared that the '/Immah had no choice in the matter for it was 
decided by divine decree (,Ibn Qutayba, 1990, vol. 1: 59). By the third century the ruler in his 












It is particularly true that the stronger and more firmly established the political 
authority was, the weaker and more marginalized the religious-intellectual authority 
was in the general public sphere. 4 As al-$aghlr says, they reluctantly came to terms 
with the reality of the Prophetic tradition, that the Qur)an and the political ruler will 
part ways and that when that happens they should not abandon the Qur)an (al-$aghlr, 
1994: 154). Academic and religious discourses, whether legal, theological, mystic or 
philosophical, were many times in response to the behaviour and actions of the 
political authority and not natural scholarship. It reminds us of Marx's comment that 
hitherto philosophers have only been interpreting the world when they should be 
transforming it. As Thomas Hobbes said, in the final analysis, neither content nor 
even reasonableness can be said to provide the binding force behind law; it is not 
Wisdom (read knowledge of the scholars) but Authority (read political power of the 
rulers) that makes a law (Postema, 1987: 11). 
Khalid MascGd points out that the relationship between shartah (where the scholar is 
only allowed to interpret and explain) and siyasah (where the ruler had the sole 
"right" to initiate and legislate) was that of dualism of two competing systems of law 
and jurisdiction. Never did sharlcah solely guide; rather there was a judicial practice 
based on a variety of laws derived from, amongst others, the sovereign decision of a 
ruler (MasCnd, u.p: 2-4). )lbn KhaldGn explains the usefulness of the pen in the 
4 For example, Moosagie shows that in the Indian subcontinent. the (1IIami]> acquired independent and 
genuine authority, and emerged as the formidable force (in the form of the religious seminary, 
Deoband) in Muslim socio-political life only after the collapse of the Muslim Mogul Empire in 1857 











acquisition, legitimation and preservation of power at different phases in the life of 
ruling dynasties: 
It should be known that both "the sword" and the "the pen" are instruments for the ruler to 
use in his affairs ... at the beginning of the dynasty, so long as its people are occupied in 
establishing power, the need for the sword is greater than that for "the pen". In that 
situation, "the pen" is merely a servant and agent of the ruler's authority ... In mid-term of 
the dynasty, the ruler can to some degree dispense with "the sword". In this situation the 
men of the pen have more authority ... [T]he pen is the instrument the ruler uses ... to 
supervise and administer his realm. ('Ibn KhaldOn, 1958: 46-47) 
Mabruk interprets this Khaldunian justification of the priority of politics over 
knowledge as an entrenched perception that it is "the sword" that creates events and 
situations, whilst "the pen" only confirms, legitimizes and seeks to preserve the 
existing political authority (Mabruk, 2002: 167). The pen, though independent, lives 
in the shadow of the sword in that it cannot - it does not seem to have done so in 
Muslim history create or be the originator of an event; rather it seems to respond 
always to an already created situation. And therefore the scholars came to accept the 
"authority" of the sword once it had established its power. Did not Abmad b. I:Ianbal 
say that whoever, good or corrupt, comes to power through the sword has become 
the legitimate Caliph and is to be addressed as the Commander of the Faithful 
(YaSll1, 1998: 336)? 
This position or attitude of the (u!anu7) must, however, not be interpreted as a 











them. Jackson suggests that in reality it reflects the phenomenon of non-
establishment cU/clmtP, meaning that this behaviour of apparently political passivism, 
or even insouciant attitude vis-a.-vis politics at the top, was in no way so when it 
came to the shwFah (Jackson, 1996: xxiii). The (ldamtP created a separate space to 
function as independent authorities, alongside the State. Specifically during the early, 
extremely strong, Abbasid state the (ulamlP knew all too well that they lacked the 
powerful resources the military, finances, etc. that the State possessed and were 
thus unable to organize themselves in order to directly challenge the State. 
From a Foucauldian angle on knowledge and power we can argue, of course, that the 
scholars did indeed have power. Specifically, because they are, according to a 
Prophetic saying, the heirs of the Prophets who inherit knowledge that is truth. And 
truth, as Foucault said, is not outside of power or lacking in power (Foucault, 1980: 
131). The intellectual (as authority), he argued, can operate and struggle at the 
general level of that regime of truth, which is so essential to the structure and 
functioning of our society. The essential political problem for the intellectual is to 
ascertain the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth (Foucault, 1997: 42-
43). 
3) The Exercise of Ra)y: Between the Rulers and the Scholars? 
Theoretically it was accepted that where the Qur)an ic or the establ ished Prophetic 
Sunnah gave explicit rulings the individual (ruler and scholar) or the community 
could not exercise independent reasoning though for some it applied not to the 











neither the Qur)an nor the Sunnah gave explicit guidance, independent reasoning 
(rajy or jijtiluid) was allowed. What, however, became a point of contention was who 
had the authority to exercise )ijfihad al-ra>y - was it exclusive to that one party and 
what was the scope of that authority? The political-religious theories of )Ibn al-
MuqaffaC, the early jurists (such as Malik, )AbO YiJsuf, etc.) and al-ShaJjC) highlight 
the contradictory positions of the scholars regarding the issue of authority in the field 
of opinion (other than Qur)an and Sunnah). 
3.1) cAbd-Allah )Ibn al-MuqaffaC 
)Ibn al-MuqaffaC (d. 142/756) was secretary in the late Umayyad and early Abbasid 
States. He came to full prominence during his tenure as advisor to (rather, political 
mentor of) the second Abbasid Caliph Abu Jacfar al-Man~iJr in the art of governance. 
In his treatise Rislilah al-$a~ahah he primarily addresses, and rejects, what he 
believed to be two extreme views regarding the Caliph's authority vis-a-vis raJy 
(discretion) on the one hand and religious Texts (Qur)an and Sunnah) on the other. 
The first claimed that the Caliph had the right to obedience even if his commands 
were contrary to the laws of Allah. The second stated that no obedience is due to the 
Caliph if he commands with unrighteollsness. He faulted the first view for its 
ambiguity in the application and scope of the Caliph's authority, in that it declared 
the Caliph to be obeyed under all circumstances. It is extremely harmful in that it 
weakens and disparages the obedience to the Caliph, to the extreme abomination of 











second view because it impedes, and makes light of, the obedience due to the Caliph 
by making it equal to anyone who obeys Allah; if the imam is to be disobeyed when 
commanding with unrighteousness wrong and another person is to be obeyed for 
commanding \vith righteousness, then the imam (ruler) and this other (ruled subject) 
are equal in the right to be obeyed. This view, he says, is a path for the Devil to 
wrench obedience from the Caliph so that people will have no overseer in their 
affairs; a dangerous view, of course (Ibn al-Muqaffa', u.d: 348). 
He then puts forward what he regards as an unambiguous (refuting the first extreme) 
and balanced view that clearly acknowledges the )imam's exclusive and unrivaled 
right to obedience in the field of raJy (a rebuttal of the second extreme view), as 
follows: 
As for our established position when the 'inulm is not to be obeyed in [his] 
disobedience to Allah, that applies in [case of] the obligatory acts ('azc7'im al-
farlPi(f) and the penal code (aHwducf) which Allah did not grant authority to 
anyone [to interfere with]. Thus should the )im(lm prohibit the [performing of the 
daily] prayers, the fast [of Ramadan], the pilgrimage, proscribe the penal laws 
[from being applied] and license what God has forbidden then no obedience is due 
to him refutation of the first extreme view. As for our affirmation of the )imam 's 
[exclusive right] to obedience, whereon no one besides him is to be obeyed, that is 
in [matters of] raJy (opinion) and planning; the matter whose rein and firm grip 
Allah has entrusted to the authority of the )im{lms only; no one [besides the )imam] 











the treasuries [of wealth], collecting and distribution [of taxes] ... and ruling [by 
his discretion in matters] with ra)y- refutation of the second extreme view on 
matters whereon there is no athr (precedent) [from the Qur'an or Sunnah]. 
(%n al-Muqaffa<, u.d: 348-349) 
Khalid Mas(f1d explains ibn )Ibn al-MuqaffaC s discourse in the context of the latter's 
concern with the proliferation of conflicting judgments in courts due to the absence 
of an agreed-upon Sunnah. These conflicting judgments were caused by systematic 
reasoning that led to remote conclusions based neither on the Qur)an nor on Sunnah 
that were acceptable to their authors only, hence the disagreements, at times, 
severely. Ra).v, in the absence of explicit rulings from the Qur)an and Sunnah, was a 
matter of siyasah (politics) that is good governance, the authority of, and to, which 
only the )imlim possessed to give binding orders at his discretion (MasCOd, u.d: 5).5 In 
this vein he brought what he regarded as a grave situation to the attention of the 
Caliph, saying: 
And that which [requires the urgent attention of] the Prince of the Bel ievers should 
look into is with regards to the divergence, between these two cities [Syria and' Iraq], 
other [great] cities and the periphery areas, on many issues to the extent that 
contradictory rulings have reached alarming proportions on matters of blood [law of 
retribution], sexual conduct privacy and property. Hence the spilling of blood ... is 
considered permissible (ml/bal]) in AI-Hira but at the same time rendered unlawful 
5 Others .- including the 'ulamiP could only signal their opinion upon being consulted by, or respond 











(hariim) in Kiifa and likewise there is divergence within Kiifa so that [something] will 
be declared lawful in one of its regions and forbidden in another region. 
('Ibn al-Muqaffa', u.d: 353). 
Thus )Ibn al-MuqaffaCs work was a diagnosis of and remedy for the problems 
associated with the development of law (read, the living Sunnah). Contrary to this 
view, aH;aghir sees the Risiilah al-$a~iibah which he describes as an apparently 
administrative and organizational work, whilst its aim is ideological and political -
as nothing less than an attempt to achieve for the political ruler a monopoly on 
opinion (aPistibdiid bi 'I ra)y), which at the same time aims to confine the influence 
of the scholar. )Ibn al-MuqaffaC strove to "free" the political authority from the 
notion of ijm(Y that renders the opinion of the )imiim and others (the scholars) equal 
(al-Saghir, 1994: 133-141). 
In our view, al-Saghir reads too much of a political agenda in Jlbn al-MuqaffaCs 
treatise. It is true that his call for raJ:,;, to be the exclusive prerogative of the Caliph 
was influenced by his special position as secretary of state. That, however, was not 
his sole raison d' eIre, for as we saw above, he pointed out some serious 
discrepancies and contradictions that compromised fundamental Islamic invariables 
known as the five universals, namely life, intellect, honour, wealth and religion. Any 
scholar - irrespective of his political philosophy ought to be alarmed by such a 












Rather we find someone the stature of )Abu ijamid al-GhazulI, considered by al-
Saghlr as a scholar who represents the power of the intellectual authority, who wrote 
Facjlj>i~ al-Bc7rinfYJ'ah in the service of the Abbasid state, more specifically the 
Caliph al-Mustazhir who at the time had just become Caliph at the age of seventeen. 
AI-Ghazall in fact states that the Caliph himself advised him to compile a refutation 
of the Ba[iniyyah, exposing their innovations and falsehoods. The Bli{iniyyah were at 
the time the greatest political threat to the Abbasid state. al-Ghazall has two aims in 
writing this book: one, doctrinal (to expose the false doctrine of the Ba!inlyyah) and 
two, political (to extol the virtues of al-Mustazhir). 
A closer scrutiny, though, reveals that it was the political aim that qualified the 
doctrinal. The ostensible reason for which al-Ghazan declares the Ba!infyyah as 
disbelievers is doctrinal; they confer on their )imam(s) divine qualities. Yet a1-
GhazuiI almost confers the very same qualities, albeit politically, onto al-Mustazhir 
in addressing the latter as al-mawaqif al-sharffah al-muqaddasah al-nahawfyyah al-
)imamly.'vah that is the noble, sacred, prophetic position and commandments of al-
Mustazhir the Ba{inlyyah conferred the same terminology on their )imams (al-
GhazulT, u.d: 2-3). AI-Ghazall wrote this "doctrinal" treatise as a political service on 
the request of the state that needed the pen in combating its political, not doctrinal, 
enemy 
It is also to be stated that )Ibn al-MuqaffaC was not a mere lackey of the political 











writing up of a document procuring indemnity for CAbd-Allah b. cAll, who had failed 
in his revolt against al-Man~uL and having Caliph al-Man!?ur agree to and sign the 
document. As Cook and Crone says, the Iranian noble, met his death under torture 
under orders from the very Caliph - for whom he according to al-$aghIr aimed to 
achieve absolute obedience; he nursed his aristocratic ideals as secretary of a Caliph 
who could - and did freely execute him at want (Cook and Crone, 1977: 102-104). 
3.2) The Earlv Jurists 
The early jurists unlike )Ibn al-MuqaffaC regarded the exercise of raJy accessible to 
both the scholars and the rulers. However, the arbitrary nature of the practice of raJy 
within an incoherent structure of legal interpretation primarily allowed the political 
rulers to impose their opinions on all, under the pretext of preempting the 
proliferation of conflicting opinions, with negative consequences. There is no doubt 
that the scholars exercised independent reasoning and their opinions proliferated in 
the communities, but that was in situations that had no bearing upon the rule or 
position of the ruler, even where the latter might have contradicted the Qur)a.n or 
Sunnah or sound opinion.6 
For example al-Man!?ur's influence pervades when he "advised" Malik b. )Anas to 
compile a book (the Mu}va!(ah) with the following clear instructions: "[R]ecord, 
b We are reminded here of the saying of Mu'awiyah b. 'Ab! Sufyan, the first Ummayad Caliph, who 
said that he does not interfere in people's talks the scholars' rational opinions and conversations, as 
long as they do not come between him and his rule, in other words, do not criticize his rule. As 
Thompson says, ideology operates through language and that language is a medium of social action 











from this knowledge, a book. A void therein the harsh views of 'Ibn (Umar, the 
lenient concessions of 'Ibn (Abbas, and the idiosyncrasies of 'Ibn Mas([jd, Tread the 
middle path ... so that we can coerce people, God-willingly, to adhere to the 
knowledge and your book [that you will compile]". Malik accepted the advice to 
compile the book, but he strongly declined that it be enforced as a uniform code for 
all Muslims, disseminated in all provinces, that judgement takes place in accordance 
to its knowledge-content only, and that it not be contradicted (Ibn Qutaybah, 1990, 
vol.2: 202), 
Indeed Malik's refusal of the latter part of al-Man~Or's "advice" is praiseworthy; it is 
indicative of his commitment to free thought and his position that the exercise of 
opinion is the right of all. However, the mere fact that he firstly compiled it on the 
"advice" of al-Man~[jr, who then dictated the nature of the contents as well as that it 
should become a uniform code binding on all, is indicative of the reality beyond 
Malik that whenever the exercise of ra)}' fell within the public sphere, then it was the 
exclusive prerogative of the political authority. Malik's refusal to have the Muwa{!ah 
enforced as a uniform code on all Muslims did not prevent )Abo YOsuf, a rationalist 
like Malik, from having Kitah al-Khara} (compiled on the request of Caliph H<;lrOn 
ai-RashId) enforced (during Malik's lifetime) on all Muslims 'Ibn al-Muqaffa<s 












First and foremost it must be made clear that Shafici, like the early jurists recognized 
the need for ijtihad ra)y (that I translate as "informed opinion"). In this respect, 
ijalUiq and Lowry regard ShaficI's view that it is obligatory on a Muslim who is not 
in the vicinity of the kac/Jah to try and locate it serves as a kind of metaphor for legal 
interpretation in the search of God's law. Just as, in the task to locate the direction of 
the kacbah, Muslims have been provided with stars, mountains, rivers, day and night 
as instruments of guidance, so they have in disclosing God's law been provided with 
tools (ijaIHiq calls them textual indications and signs whilst Lovvry calls them signs 
and minds). ijallaq says that Shawr's analogy serves to show that just as two men 
may determine the location of the kclbah differently, so may two jurists arrive at 
difTerent solutions to the same legal problem. This point reflects, in essence, Lowry's 
statement that Shafiej adhered to the notion of a metaphysically correct solution; the 
answer is somewhere. ShafiCI's then maintains, that despite the possibility of error, 
ijtihad (exercise of regulated ra)y) should be undertaken, for abandoning it is 
tantamount to discarding prayers until there is certainty on the location of the kaC/Jah 
an argument \vhich is plainly objectionable O:lallaq, 1997: 28-29; Lowry, u.d: 29). 
If this point is indicative of anything it is indicative of ShiificI's as a tolerant and 
realistic rational ist within the hayan matrix (the entirety of law resides in two texts, 
the Qur)an and the Sunnah). 
However, unlike the early jurists he regulates ra)y (to constrain legal interpretation) 











ambit of two revealed texts -- the early jurists paid little attention to (Prophetic) 
Sunnah. Unlike the ahl 'I badfth who spurned qiytis (i.e. regulated raJy for ShafiC!) all 
together, Shafi'I, as Uallaq says, is located, in both time and doctrine, midway 
between early raJy libertinism and the later Zahirite conservatism (UalIaq, 1997: 32). 
Lowry describes ShaficI as a metaphysical realist who held firmly that there is an 
objectively correct answer to legal questions in situations where there is no directly 
relevant text, hence the need for ijtihtid (legal interpretation). [n other words, the 
correct answer, in any instance that requires ijtihtid, is not in any way dependent on 
human ability to be known; it is somewhere out there metaphysically and shows 
itself completely independent of human ability (Lowry, u.d: 329). 
So if the person (ruler or scholar) who practices Jijtihtid (legal interpretation) in 
situations is not the issue at all, but rather objectively and metaphysically correct 
ansvv'ers, then practice of opinion, within the ambit of the two texts, of course, is 
open to all, alike. provided that they operate within that ambit. This position, of 
course, contrasts starkly with that oPlbn al-MuqaffaC, who saw >ijtihtid as being the 
exclusive domain of the political ruler. It also differs from the position of the early 
jurists whose arbitrary practice of ra)y that resulted in a proliferation of conflicting 
opinions provided the rulers with the opportunity to codify law under the pretext of 
bringing uniformity and order. 
In that sense, in al-SaghIr's vIew ShaficI's thought was in essence political. His 











(jatiiwii) and commands salvaged it from a purely individualistic (read, subjective) 
character and imbue it with a spirit of inclusiveness (read, objectivity). This returns 
us to the verse (cited above) wherein the issue of {ii'ah and its scope is dealt with. 
This verse and numerous Prophetic traditions were politically exploited to enforce 
absolute obedience for the ruler almost on equal par with obedience to God. 
And this ShaficT realized, hence his fundamental existential concern: to who is 
obedience due (Ii mann takilnu al-!iiCah)? Because the ruler possessed, more than 
anyone, the means to influence and coerce (the carrot and the stick) he was in the 
position to impose his opinion and force others to accept his "juristic" preference 
eisti~lsiin). ShafiCI's "limitation of free speech and interpretation", i.e. his anti-
rationalism then provided in essence the theoretical basis - whether ShafiCj intended 
for it to be so or not - a restriction on the power (vadd) of the sulran who enjoyed, at 
least or should in the view of )Ibn al-Muqaffa<, the exclusive right to the exercise of 
ray' (al-SaghTr, 1994: 162-175). 
Conclusions 
Authority in annals of the history of the Islamic cultural legacy is a complex 
phenomenon that must be analysed and understood, within specific social paradigms, 
in light of the social and political function of knowledge and how it created the 
necessary and perennial relationship between the possessor of knowledge and the 
possessor of political power. The immediate and apparent picture that emerges, 











the political authority its power always pervasive, though it was very swift to resort 
to brute force if deemed necessary - that directed and dominated that relationship. 
Political rulers allowed scholars to function undisturbed only in proportion to their 
knowledge activity, which had no bearing upon their rule. But knowledge by its 
nature can never be silent or neutral. And that is something the ruler knows and 
therefore he does not accept neutrality from the scholar. 7 And therein lies the 
potential power of the intellectual authority. 
The situation at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first 
century seems not to have changed, at least, not radically. The question is whether 
Muslim scholars can continue to build on the intellectual tradition that they have 
inherited and yet seriously engage, if not radically reconstruct, the epistemology on 
which the past scholars have conducted knowledge activity. An epistemology that 
will enhance the realization of the Islamic weltanschauung so beautifully described 
by RaJ:!man: the establishment of essential human egalitarianism and the constitution 
of a community for goodness and justice in the world; in one phrase an ethically 
based sociopolitical order "under God". A knowledge tradition in which the deepest 
concerns of the Islamic ontology, as espoused in the Qur)an, will be reflected. Until 
then Muslim scholars will have to be content with the perennial question asked since 
the end of the nineteenth century: why have the Muslims lagged behind whilst others 
(read, the West) have advanced? Without any tangible answer, that is! 
7 For example, the neutrality of 'Abd-Allah b. 'Umar did not save him the wrath of the Umayyad 
governor al-I:Iajjaj b. YOsuf who, according to 'AbO al-'Arab 'I-TamlmI in his Ki((/h al-Mi~n, had a 
hand in the death (read, assassination) of 'Ibn 'Umar. The ruling authority is not satisfied with mere 












SHAFICI'S BAYAN PROJECT 
Towards Precision and Order (Naf1wu al-l)abf wa rl 
Tan?lm) 
The day when scholars of Traditions speak (articulate) it will be with the tongue of 
that lad. 
(YIu~ammad b. al-I:Iasan al-ShaybanI) 
Shari'] is a philosopher in fOUf things: In language, meaning [of words], differences of 
opinion 1 of people and law 
«Abel al-Raziq, u.d: 231) 
This thesis is essentially a critique of Fazlur Ral)man's notion of the living 
Sunnah However, such a critique places one squarely in front of ShaficI's 
treatises. Indeed, Mul;ammad b. al-I:Iasan al-ShaybanI in the quote above is 
referring to ShafiCI and his eminence as a scholar. He predicts Shafi(j"s success 
since no other person had at the time reached his level of articulation of the 
Sunnah. The second quote as far reaching in its indication, as the first, is by 
Al;mad b. I:Ianbal. Ral)man challenging Shafi'\' s thought then requires an in-
depth analysis of ShaficI' s works, which is the focus of this chapter. 
To understand Ral;man analysis in relation ShaficI's work, my aim is simply to 











tradition (the living Sunnah) of three generations, which he problematized for 
not residing wholly in the two texts, the Qur)an and the Slinnah, and destroy it? 
This RaDman claims and in fact laments. Why did he employ an arsenal of 
hermeneutic rubrics such as 'ammlkha''>''i,jumlahlna$,'>, naskh, ikhtilafal-I:zadlth, 
etc. The answers to these questions allows one to understand and engage 
ShaWl's discourse in terms of its strengths and weaknesses, its competence 
and mastery, and its incoherence and striking propensity for rationalizing 
contradictions in source interaction. More importantly, it identifies how 
RaDman's assertions contrast with ShafiCj's work and highlight the limitations 
of his refutations in respect of the latter. 
This chapter reads ShaficI's hayan from two angles. One, it interrogates 
Rai)man's assertion that ShaficI was anti-rationalist and that he spearheaded a 
decisive and successful intervention in the living Sunllah that created stability 
but at the cost of creativity and originality. Two it critically engages ShaWl's 
hermeneutical devices that allowed him to deal with the contradictions in the 
I:zadlth, which was hitherto not synonymous with the Slinnah, from which he 
reconstructed the Prophetic Sunnall. 
The first reading is an external critique. It is external in that it reflects on the 
views of scholars who hold this view, one which this thesis does not itself hold 
In fact this thesis very much challenges the aforementioned analysis and 











content of this critique, which in sum is a rejection of ShafiCj's methodology. I 
find their critique to be fundamentally ideological in nature. 
I call their critique ideological in order to separate it from that of the 
Orientalists who in my view, read ShafiCT as not overtly ideological. Further, 
their critique of ShafiCj is not only a simple and innocent academic evaluation, 
again unlike that of Orientalists, rather it embraces their own methodologies 
towards a new discourse whether Modernist, Post-Modernist, Enlightened or 
Secularist within Islam. 
The second reading is an internal critique formulated by this thesis and rests on 
seeking a scientific analysis of the topic. In this regard, I employ Joseph 
Lowry's The Legal-Theoretical Content of the Risalah of Mll~ammad h. ~Idrls 
AI-ShafN and Wael IJallaq's A History of Islamic Legal Theories as primary 
sources. 
1) Biographv 
According to the majority of the historians of the jurists, Mul)ammad b. )Idrls 
al- Shari', was born in 1501767 in Gaza eAbO Zahra u.d: 14), although some 
narrations purport that he was born in CAsqalan. or Yemen or Makkah. His 
lineage is Qurashiite more precisely linked to al-Mugalib brother of Hashim, 
the Prophet's great grandfather. He was orphaned at a very young age where 











Qurashiite lineage, but also because of poverty. There is agreement that he 
studied in Makkah as a student of Sufyan b. eUyayna and in Madlnah where his 
principal teacher was Malik b. Anas). 
He seems to have had a connection with Yemen. Some sources suggest that he 
was born there, not least because his mother, according to Shafi<} himself, was 
from Azd a great Yemeni tribe. Other suggestions are that he went to Yemen to 
work as either a judge in Najran or as an assistant to a judge. Yet sti .11 others 
suggest that he went to Yemen to foment revolution, supposedly in line with 
claims that he had ShiCite leanings, or else, to oppose those who were 
fomenting revolution (Lowry, u.d: 3-4). 
Lowry supports his stance, by referring to )AbO NuCaym who preserved many 
anecdotes of Shafier s supposed trips to Yemen. These anecdotes ascribe 
different motives to ShafieI's visits to Yemen. For example, Schacht holds that 
his visit(s) to Yemen was for personal reasons. Chaumont asserts that he joined 
a ShlCite rebellion while al-Nadlm in his Fihrist labels Shafi<j as "shadfdfi al-
tashaYYll or strongly ShJCite. Whatever Shafici's motive(s) might have been, it 
refutes Na~r )Abo Zayd's simplistic and ideologically informed claim that 
Shaf'JCI's going to Yemen especially \vhen he worked there as a judge was just 
a single indication amongst others, including his religious discourse, that he 











2) The Bayan Scheme: ShafiCI at Work 
It is in the Risalah that ShafiCI articulated his mission. Wael I:Iallaq sums it up 
as the following basic principles: (1) the law must be derived exclusively from 
revealed scripture; (2) the Prophetic Sunnah constitutes a binding source of 
law; (3) contradiction exists neither between the Sunnah and the Qur)an nor 
among verses or ~adfths within each of these two sources; (4) the two sources 
compliment each other hermeneutically; (5) a legal ruling derived from 
unambiguous and widely transmitted texts is certain and subject to no 
disagreement, whereas a ruling that is inferred by means of ijrihad and qiyas 
may be subject to disagreement: and (6) that ijtihad and qiyas, as well as the 
criteria of consensus, are prescribed by the revealed sources (I:Iallaq, 1997: 30-
31). Lowry calls it the hayan scheme; he translates hoyan as statement or, more 
precisely, a statement of a particular rule of law. In it the entirety of law 
resided in two texts, the Qur' an and the Sunnah, the idea that lies at the core of 
the Risalah (Lowry, u.p: 19). 
I contend that two components and stages, namely the philosophical and the 
organizational, can be demarcated in ShafiCI's hayan, which help to identify 
both his strengths and inconsistencies. The components are referred to as such 
because the hayan is constructed out of these two separate yet organically 
linked entities. Stages, because the philosophical idea of the ha:van precedes 











conceptualisation of the Prophetic Sunnah and its authority, while the 
organizational is his method of reconstructing the SlInnah. Thus, after having 
conceptualised his bayan idea he engaged this information from which he then 
reconstructed this authoritative Prophetic Sunnah. I identify the philosophical 
as the core aspect of the bayan and 1 find it both natural and intelligible whilst 
it is the organizational aspect that is the object of my critique where I hope to 
highlight ShafiCI's contradictions and at times idealism. 
It is also my contention that by reading Shaficl's with an awareness of these 
two separate yet organically I inked stages that a better and more balanced 
evaluation of his work can be carried out. I believe that it is because of failing 
to do so that RaDman and )Abu Zayd have made a rather one sided and at times 
superficial critique of ShaficI, stooped in a lamentation that ShaficI's destroyed 
a living tradition or in an analysis of suspicion by RaDman and ) Abu Zayd 
respectively. It is equally true also that the contemporary champions of the 
classical discourse have failed to construct a critical discourse on ShaficI. 
2.1) The Philosophical Component and Stage 
The thrust of ShaficI's bayan is to establish authority for the Prophetic Sunnah. 
In this regard he is not at all concerned with the Qur'an, which he sees as an 
already as universally accepted source of legislation whose authority is not 
questioned and contains very little law in comparison to the Sunnah (Lowry, 











the Sunnah is a valid, binding, independent source of law and more 
importantly is the exclusive legislative supplement to the Qurcan both as an 
independent source of legislation and in its interaction with the Quran. 
As noted in chapter one, local doctrines and the opinions of individuals were 
hitherto treated almost equivalently to the 8unnah of the Prophet. This was a 
defining feature of this period. Islamic jurisprudence was characterized by 
direct appeals to practical reason through ra)y or dependence on the juristic 
dicta of famous scholars and simply by no explicit aim to authority. In short it 
rested on the "divergent conceptions of legal authority in this period" 
(Brockopp, 2002: 4-17 , Fadel, 2002: 161). 
Starting from paragraph 53 of the Risalah Shafi'I explains the significance of 
hayiin and how it is to be realized. He says: 
The totality of what God has made clear to His creation [aMlla Ii kha/qihi] in His 
Book ... are several: (1) Among them are those things which God has expressed in an 
explicit text [l1a~·.)·] like his general obligations, to wit, that they must perform 
prayers ... He has forbidden wine drinking ... (2) And among it what he has confirmed 
in His Book [abkama] and then explained it on the tongue of His Prophet such as the 
number of prayers ... (3) Among them too, things for which God's Messenger has 
provided a Sunnah and in respect of which God has no explicit rule. God has, in His 
Book, imposed the obligation to obey His IVW.\.\"·flV,'" [the Sunnah], and to eany out 
His rulings [wa qad jarcuja AI/ah fi kilclhihi ((1((I{a rasa! lihi wa '/ intihil ilil 











seek them out by means of legal interpretation [ijtihiid]. Emphasis mine (Shafi'i, 
1979: 21-22). 
From paragraphs 258 to 309 of the Rislilah he argues passionately for the 
special position of the Prophetic Sunnah. H is argument is fi lied with verses of 
the Quran and his own rational interpretation of these verses, which constitute 
a solid synthesis of textual proofs and rational deductions (Shafi'I, 1979: 79-
1(5). The single, fundamental religious and spiritual implication is that God 
has not only obligated obedience for Mui)ammad but also linked his 
(Mui)ammad's) obedience to obedience due to God. From his re-citing and 
interpretation of these verses, Shafi')' s religious methodology is clear: a 
Muslim's obedience to God is contingent upon his or her obedience to the 
Prophet. His argument is at once academic and rational and also spiritual and 
religious one's faith depends upon accepting the Prophet and his Sunnah as 
the only authority after that of the Quran, which here indicates God. 
Before I come to the organizational component and the stage of the hayan I 
want to first deal with the external critique as mentioned earlier of Rai)man and 
)Abu Zayd. Their primary critique and persistent accusation is that al-Shafi'i 
was anti-rational; that he was the literary symbol and pioneer of an anti-
rationalist epistemology. They base this critique on their reading of Shafi'i's 
notion of ijma', apart from their general critique of his conceptualization of 











2.2) ShaficI and ljma 
To Ra\:lman Shaficl's concept of ijmcY, as diametrically opposed to the ijnuYof 
the early generations, is indicative of his abhorrence of free-interpretation 
(ijtihad). The ijma' of the early generations was a continuous process of 
independent reason ing to create and recreate the content of the Sunnah and the 
guarantee for the rectitude or the working infallibility of the growing content 
of the Sunnah (Ra\:lman, 1994: 19). 
Shaficl rejected any claim that ijnl(Y has and can be achieved in this manner. 
ljma' is only possible on the essentials (jumlah al-fariPh;J) of which no one 
could be ignorant. Further when ijma' is claimed no one will be found to 
disagree such as the amount of units or raka'at in each prayer as in the case of 
Zuhr, which has four or the prohibition on drinking alcohol (ShafieI', 1983, 
vol. 7: 295). For Shaficf, ijma' is akin to a kind of spiritual solidarity of the 
Muslim jamiYah on the principles of ~alal, ~ar{im and {{leah (obedience), 
principles which have been clearly defined and demarcated by God and His 
Prophet and not left to the opinions of men (Shafn, 1979: 472-475). 
This is in line with Shllfiej's epistemology that ijma( does not and cannot exist 
independently of and is totally subordinated to the authority of the Quran and 
Sunnah under whose aegis it must be brought. Thus according to Lowry he 
walked a kind of tightrope seeking to maintain a rigorous ontological 











Ijmc[C for the ancient schools though was their local consensus, specifically that 
of the Medinese although the (Iraqis' extended, in theory, to all regions, and 
they were not very tolerant and accepting of other schools' consensus. What 
was achieved at best was some type of inferred consenSllS on the opinion(s) of 
a scholar(s) when no one was known to have disagreed with it (lam yuClam 
lalm mukhallf). The ancient schools' iima' had an obsession with if:za!ah 
(complete comprehension) hence their declaring of their interpretations to be 
ijmaC with binding authority, which in essence meant a stifling of difference of 
opInIOn. 
Thus what SharicI opposed, was not ijnuY per se, but an obsession with getting 
everything completely right especially of some person or regional school's 
interpretation and declaring it ijma( whilst excluding the opinions of others. 
Shari'I then is the one, ironically so, who acknowledged and accepted 
disagreement as the necessary and natural result of ijrihcld and not the 
champions of the living Sunnah. What he demanded though was order and 
uniformity. RaDman's claim that the ijmil of the early generations was a type 
of working infallibility is therefore a somewhat romanticized notion. In fact, a 
a rationalist of the stature of the MuCtazilite )IbrahIm al-Na~~am regarded the 
consensus of the community on questions left to personal opinion and 











But Shafiej, as Schacht says, was unable to dispense completely with the idea 
of consensus of the scholars. It is here, in my view that the contradictions in 
ba.van scheme appear. Faced with, what had by now become a normative mass 
of information made up from the individual interpretations of the early 
generations (their ijmaC) and Prophetic abadith that came to constitute the 
content of the Sunnah, he found himself unable to reject all these materials. 
Indeed, a considerable amount of it was Prophetic sayings and practice in the 
form of badUh, which existed from the very beginning of Islam and throughout 
the Prophet's lifetime. As Rabman notes, the badfth from the Prophet must 
have existed from the very beginning of Islam (Rabman, 1994: 29). 
Nonetheless, it was no mean feat, after almost two centuries, to clearly separate 
Prophetic abadUh from the opinions and interpretations of the early 
generations. As RaDman rightly says, already in ShafiCj's time a vast number of 
badflhs, originally the opinions of individuals, had become available (RaDman, 
1982: 26). 
ShafiCj accepted, rather naively it seems, the claims of the jurists as sound 
when they mentioned that their agreement on a particular matter was based on 
a report or story of the Prophet. For example, he says to his interlocutor that if 
the people say that what they have agreed to, is based on a report from God's 
Messenger then it should be as they say, God willing (al-Shafi'i, 1979: 472). 
This is wishful thinking on his part. It is from these very materials that he 











the many sunnas or arbitrary opinions of the early jurists which were products 
of the Sllnnah-i)tihad-i)ma' relationship. Thus the very Unui' of the early 
generations that al-Shaft'i had rejected became for him a substantial source of 
information. 
2.3) ShaficI's Political Ideology 
As a general point of departure )Abu Zayd charges Sh5Jici with an attempt to 
negate the intellect when the latter rationally, and paradoxically so, establishes 
the principle that only the revealed text of the Quran and the Sunned? contains 
solutions to all problems. For lAbu Zayd, what this in reality indicates is 
ShaficT's ontology of theistic predetermination. lAbu Zayd demonstrates his 
claim with an example. Shafici's position on the use of the word kulli (all) a 
term that indicates generality (dilalah al-'amm) in the Quran ic verse: "God is 
the Creator of everything" he say, as remaining general and not 
particularized is indicative of Shafici's ideological adherence to the doctrine of 
theistic predetermination that negates human free-will and deprives humankind 
of the right to choose his actions. Supporting this is Shafici's willingness to co-
operate with the political authority C Abu Zayd, 1996: 62-69). 
lAbu Zayd adopts a methodology of projection (manha) al-isqaJ) when 
analysing Shafic!. Here he is guilty of vulgar eisegesis in that he reads into 
Shafic} his ideological belonging that stems from his objection and total 











al-salafi al-rajaCf al-muhaymin a!-m16isir), of which he regards ShafiCj to be 
the pioneer. 
Firstly, Shafic]'s notion and employment of Camm in the verse cited as well as 
revealed texts must be understood within the broader context of the 
cammlkha00 hermeneutic rubric. It was one of his hermeneutical tools to, 
amongst other things, harmonize what was thought to be potential 
contradictions between Qurcanic verses and between Qurcan and Sunnah on the 
one hand and Sunnah and Sunnah on the other. His application of cqtmmlkha00 
is thus strictly legal. 
Secondly, Shafic]'s alleged willingness to co-operate with the political 
authority must be rejected as unfounded. )Abo Zayd's conclusion that he co-
operated with the state simply because he worked in its service in Najran is 
simply not convincing. That many scholars worked in the service of the State 
or even had a cordial relationship with it does not necessari Iy mean that they 
co-operated with the political authority, more so willingly. One such person is 
Malik b. Anas, )Abo Zayd's example of a rationally orientated jurist who 
refused to co-operate with the political authority. Malik not only had a good 
relationship with Caliph al-Man~Or he compiled the Muwaqah on the advice of 











Contrast this with Shaf(I's writing of the Risiilah which was one, written on 
the request of an ordinary person called (Abd al-Rabman b. Mahdt and not the 
Caliph and, unlike the MUvva![ah which, in essence. does not contain creative 
and original views, but rather the progressive interpretations of earlier 
generations, the Risalah is an original and innovative work however 
retrogressive it may be viewed. 
In addition, Malik even accepted gifts from the CAbbasid Caliph ('Ibn Qutayba, 
1990, vol 203). Can Malik, in receiving gifts from al-Man:?ur be accused of 
co-operating with the political authority? In fact he also never engaged in 
political activity or rhetoric against the State. He was lashed once, for narrating 
in a purely academic capacity and not politically motivated at all, a fJadith not 
his own juristic verdict, by the rather over-zealous governor of Madtnah, Jacfar 
b. SUlayman who viewed the ~zadlfh potentially dangerous as it stated that 
political allegiance for the Caliph under coercion is not binding. Nevertheless 
al-Man~Dr apologized to Malik and removed the governor from his post in a 
most humiliating manner CIbn Qutayba, 1990, vol 197). 
Ironically it is in ShafiC!' s working for the State that he stands out as an 
independent scholar who very soon earned the wrath of the political authority 
when he pointed out and objected to the governor's unjust treatment of his 
subjects. The latter reported him to Caliph Harun aI-RashId with the accusation 











with his tongue what a warrior could not do with his sword. e Abn Zahra, u.d: 
20-22). 
The Risalah precisely deals with the critical question of obedience ({iYah) in 
order to establish to whom it is due. ShariC} is unequivocal that it is due only to 
God and His Prophet. Once !(Yah as an abstract notion has been delineated 
within the bayan matrix of the Quran and the Prophetic Sunnah it then 
fundamentally covered and qualified authority whether political, intellectual or 
of any other form. A primary concern of ShariC! was rectification of concepts 
(ra~hlh al-mafahlm) i.e. how they are understood and employed especially by 
those in authority like rulers, scholars, fathers and men .. Hence he is at pains to 
elucidate concepts such as command, obedience and legitimacy (al-Saghir, 
1994: I 183). 
Although al-Shafi'j did not, directly, address or confront the political authority, 
one corollary of his del ineation of !(Yah is the restriction of the power of the 
ruler even if in theory only. If opinion is practiced outside the notion of !cJCah 
to one universal authority (Quran and Sunnah) then it becomes possible for 
the one who possesses the greatest means, to enforce his opinion. That is 
precisely what potentially characterized the living Sunnah. 
Given the above, the entire notion of Shafi'! as an anti-rationalist must be put 
to the test or at least qualified. As Lowry says: "Although I believe that an 











rationalist, in the (perhaps limited) sense that he eschews abstract reason as a 
source of authority, some recent revisionist scholarship has viewed his thought 
as more hospitable to the use of reason than had previously been thought" 
(Lowry, u.p: 42). 
The reception of Sharic!, and in fact the Risalah for a whole century after the 
death of Shafi'!, by other scholars of his time makes it difficult to place him in, 
or for that matter exclude to him from either of the traditionalist camp or the 
rationalists camp. The traditionalists thought him to be involved with the 
rationalists and accused him of MuCtazilite tendencies. For the rationalists, in 
turn, he was an advocate of some fundamental traditionalist doctrines (I:Iallaq, 
1997: 31; cAbd a1-Raziq, u.d: 226). As further proof of this point, it is quite 
revealing that the champion of the traditionalist camp, )Ibn Qutayba (d. 276) in 
his book AI-MaCari! does not list ShafiC! among the a,~~ah al-hadUh 
(traditionalists), nor does he place him among the rationalists CIbn Qutayba, 
1987: 277- 286).1 He mentions ShafiCj only in passing reference in his Ta>wfl 
numbering him amongst a group of jurists elbn Qutayba, u.d: 210). 
Mll~pfa cAbd al-Raziq narrates an anecdote as further evidence that Shafic! 
was not considered - from the ahl '[ ~adifh. Mu~(ab al-Zubayr! narrates that 
his father and ShafiCj used to compose poetry. Sharic! recited some poetry from 
1 It is inconceivable that 'Ibn Qutayba had no knowledge of Shafi'T. He knew Shafi<I's teacher 
Sufyan b, 'Uyayna and 'Abd al-Rai)man b, MahdI on whose request Shari'I wrote the Risaiah, 











the tribe of Hudhayl and said to [Mu~Cab or his father] do not let the ahl 'I 
~adlth come to know of this for they do not tolerate it. (CAbd al-Raziq, u.d: 
220). 
ShafiCI recognized that the human capacity to reason plays a positive role. Two 
passages from the Risalah demonstrate the point. In paragraph 1445 he says 
that God bestowed intellects on humankind and, by means of these indicated to 
them how to distinguish between disparate things. In paragraph 1453 he says 
that, if the scholars seek the answer by means of ijtihad using their intellects 
and their knowledge of the indications after seeking assistance from God, then 
they have carried out what is incumbent on them (ShaficI, 1979: 501-503). In 
two instances, he identifies solutions to problems as maCqill (reasonable) - not 
based on text - describing his solutions as follows: the one which is most 
obvious intelligible (al-maCqill al-?ahir) and what he considered to most 
closely resemble the policy of God's Book, and what is reasonable (Lowry, 
u.d: 419-420).2 
ShafiCI refers to the intellect pejoratively when he uses the phrase ahl 'I cuqill. 
By this he means those group of people (scholars) who refuse to tie legal 
interpretation to revelation, that is, their use of isti~1San and abandoning of 
qiyas. It is clear that ShaficI is not against the intellect or rational ism per se. 
Rather he is against the unregulated and arbitrary usage of opinion in legal 











by means of isti~siin but endorses istidliil, that describes the jurist's mental 
process in hard cases where there is no explicit text ruling (Lowry, u.d: 417-
423). 
In line with my claim that the living Sunnah was an arbitrary practice, lacking 
a coherent structure within which to function, and that it was very much the 
result of political excesses, I argue that if Shari(I was anti-rational then he was 
anti-rational precisely because of that reality. He \vas anti-rational only in 
proportion to a living tradition that was fraught with contradictions and 
manipulated so easily by the political authority. In a milieu where the political 
authority, in reality, had the exclusive say on matters of opinion it seems that 
that reality could only be challenged by a discourse that apparently shunned a 
rationality that was so exploited and incoherently conducted. 
3) The Organizational/Operational Component-Stage 
It is at this stage that ShafiCj demonstrates his skills at applying his 
hermeneutical techniques, primarily to harmonize conflicting texts and 
contradictory passages. He is at pains to show that source texts in their 
interaction, inter or intra, can combine to express coherent rules, and that no 
textual problem, born out of contradictory or what would only be apparently 
contradictory, in his view, is too difficult to be explained and resolved. 
Through these hermeneutical techniques, seven in number, he organizes the 











components of his bayan. Out of the seven, I will discuss two. They are the 
(amm/kha~,~ hermeneutic rubric and the naskh hermeneutic tool. 3 
I will try to demonstrate that a substantial part of ShnJiCI's application, of these 
hermeneutic tools, illustrates his uncritical zeal to negate what he had accepted 
as the content of the Sunnah, which was permeated with conflict and by his 
time had already been projected back to the Prophet and some to the 
Companions or evolved into ijmac. As Coulson says: "Shaficl's insistence, 
upon this overriding role of the Sunnah of MUQammad and his outright 
rejection of any arguments which tended to jeopardize it, can best be seen in 
his approach to the question of apparent contradictions in the substance of the 
divine revelation" (Coulson. 1978: 57). As a theorist, ShafiCj failed to achieve 
equilibrium between principal (bayan idea) and judgment (materials of the 
Sunnah). As Rawls argues that the judgments with which a theory is required 
to be in equilibrium are considered judgments of justice. And if the theorist 
decided that the judgments are the product of questionable influences or 
instincts, he should attain equilibrium by revising the judgments rather than the 
principles (Kukathas and Pettit, 1990: 7-8). Shafi(l does no such thing; his aim 
is to achieve the principal (the baylin) irrespective of the inherited materials. 
Before I give my critique of ShafiCl's particular employment of «(lmmlkha~'~ 
and naskh I want to state that I do accept these tools of interpretation, in 











principal, as both natural and necessary and that Shafi'}, and others, have 
indeed applied it, at times, naturally and logically in legal interpretation. 
3.1) cAmml KhiissHenneneutic Rubric 
Lowry designates two salient features of the (ammlkhil.~·:; rubric as it is used in 
the Risalah. The first takes a legislative pronouncement found in one text, the 
(amm which seemingly applies generally to all people and then on the basis of 
another text (kha:f:f) restricts and narrow the scope of the first text's application 
to specific people. For example the Qur<anic rules governing inheritance by 
spouses and parents or children of the deceased, are expressed in general 
terms, but the Sunnah has limited their sphere of appl ication: 
The Sllnnah of God's Messenger indicates that He [God] only meant certain 
parents and spouses and not others. That is, [he required] that the religion of 
the parents and their children and of the spouses. be the same, and that the 
heir who is a parent or spouse not be a murderer [of the deceased] and not a 
slave (Shafi'l, 1979: 65). 
The second is a technique for harmonizing potential contradictions, which 
involve source interaction viz. Qur<an ISunnah and SunnahlSunnah (Lowry, 
2004, vol. I I : 9-10). Some of these "potential" contradictions were indeed stark 
contradictions. As Burton says any student is aware of the extent to which 
Sunnah contradicts Sunnah (Burton, 1990: 3). However, for ShafiCi there were 











explain away contradictions as only apparent; for as he said Sunnah never 
contradicts the Quran or Sunnah (ShaficI, 1979: 146). I f he meant with 
Sunnah, what RaDman calls, the concept of Sunnah as opposed to content, then 
he was right. However, he summarily and quite capriciously took it for granted 
that all these materials were the Sunnah of the Prophet and not possibly the 
opinions of the early generations as well. 
The very example on inheritance is indicative of that conflict that is the ruling 
that the Quran verse is restricted by Sunnah which states that people i.e. 
parents, children, and spouses cannot inherit from one another if their religions 
differ. Yet we find that this was not a unanimous "Sunnah" accepted by all; 
MuCawiya b. )Abi Sufyan issued a verdict that a Muslim heir can inherit from 
his or her Christian or Jewish deceased parent, child or spouse. One of the 
scholars commented that this was the best verdict he had ever heard (l~awas, 
1997: 61). Can one not question whether Sunnah, like this, which totally 
forbids Muslims inheriting from non-Muslims parents, was really Sunnah or 
originally someone's opinion that became "Sunnah"? [n addition, one wonders, 
had MuCawiya (as a political authority) not given that verdict whether we 
would have had this Sunnah. which is clearly in conflict with the first Sunnah. 
For ShafiCI these "apparent" contradictions can easily be rationalized or 











3.2) The Naskh Hermeneutic Rubric 
By ShlificI's time the phenomenon of naskh had already been in operation 
along various diverse theories. As Burton says: "Naskh refers not to one, but 
several quite unrelated 'phenomena' which were gradually brought under the 
one rubric, owing to a series of decisions taken in the course of the 
development of what was to prove a spectacularly 'successful' theory" 
(Burton, 1990: 18). 
According to Burton, the first was wholly exegetical i.e. Muslims thought they 
had detected contradictions, however slight in their view, in the Quran e.g. Q 
2:256 that states there should be no compulsion in religion was thought to refer 
only to the People of the Book who were not to be converted by force, whilst 
in respect of polytheist (mushrikln) it was thought to have been abrogated by Q 
9: 5 which states ki II the polytheists wherever you find them (Burton, 1990: 1-
3). This alleged contradiction was clearly imagined, hence the need for a tool 
to explain it away; naskh became that tool. Ayatollah )AbO 'I Qasim al-Khoei, 
d. 1992) although he accepts the phenomenon of naskh in principle, likewise 
refuted beyond doubt the claims that so many verses of the Quran had been 
abrogated (naskh). Out of the 138 verses that are said to have been abrogated 
he found that not one, in reality, has been abrogated (al-Khoei, 1987: 277-379). 
There are other theories, not premised on any notion of contradiction between 
the sources but on the idea of superseding them where Quran superseded 











superseded Sunnah. There is also the view that naskh is indicative, in the 
words of> Abu Zayd, of the greatest proof of the progressive dialectic between 
revelation and the lived reality as naskh is the cancellation of one ruling by 
another ostensibly to meet the vicissitudes of time and perhaps space. 
I f, says) Abu Zayd, the text in its fundamental character, from the perspective 
that it is revelation that begins from concepts of the [human] lived real ity then 
it must in its evolution take that reality into account ('Abu Zayd, 1994: 117-
120). There are of course Muslim scholars, both ancient (the most notable) AbO 
Muslim aPI~fahanl) and contemporary such as I:Iasan al-BaqurI who reject the 
idea of naskh altogether. 
For ShaficI naskh is a hermeneutical tool. It represents an attempt to explain the 
interrelationship of two or more revealed source texts by putting them into a 
historical sequence, and further, representing the means for explaining or 
eliminating apparent contradictions. It allows the contradictions to stand and 
then resolves them through the claim that one of the several irreconcilable texts 
came later in time and superseded the other(s). Thus naskh represents an 
acknowledgement of contradiction but explains it as part of a divine legislative 
plan that unfolds inside time and space (Lowry, u.p: 122-123). 
A careful perusal, however, of the Sunnah content reveals that it was naskh. 
which allowed for material permeated with countless contradictions, to be 











easy matter. It depended fundamentally on precise historical knowledge of the 
Occasion of Revelation (ashab al-nuzfil) in order to know which verse or 
badfth was revealed last i.e. the nasikh (the ruling that abrogates), and which 
one was revealed first i.e. the mansfikh(the abrogated ruling) e Abu Zayd, 
1994: 121). To do this the very conflicting material, to which naskh was to be 
applied, was depended on. It is here that much of these materials, in order to 
abrogate or be abrogated or both, had to be attributed to the Prophet. As Burton 
says, attribution is isnad; isnad implies chronology and chronology is the very 
essence of naskh (Burton, 1990: 17). 
3.2.1) Naskh at Work: Punishment for Adultery 
In order to dispel any notion of conflict between the various Quran verses and 
the numerous badlths on the punishment for adultery, Shafi<j argues primarily 
on the basis of naskh, that Quran 4: 15-16: "Those of your women who 
commit abomination (fabishah) .. . detain them in their quarters until death 
overtakes them until God appoints a way for them ... " revealed first was 
abrogated by Q 24:2: "the female and male adulterers flog them each one 
hundred lashes ... " Then the Sunnah, he so-called, <Ubada fwd/th intervenes 
which drastically changes the rule of Q 24:2 states: "Take this from me ... God 
has appointed a way for them; the virgin [who fornicates] with a virgin: one 
hundred lashes and one year's banishment; the non-virgin with a non-virgin: 











From the text of this ~wdlth we note that it addresses the penal regime of Q 4: 
16 (God has appointed a way for them), meaning that it was an instance of 
either explanatory Sunnah or stand-alone Sunnaic text that brought a new 
ruling. However in paragraph 376 of the Risalah, Shafi(I states that Q: 24: 2 
abrogates the provisions of Q 4: \5- J 6 (Shafi(I, 1979: 129). A further instance 
of abrogation now occurs within the SUlll1ah materials when the Prophet only 
stones two non-virgins (Mii'iz and the employer's wife) on two separate 
incidents and does not flog them; flogging for non-virgins had been abrogated. 
These reports are indicative of a pervasive conflict in the Sunnah material as 
well as an assumption in the interpretation of what Q 4: 15- J 6 (its penal 
provisions) meant. In turn it developed into conflict between the Qur<an and 
the Sunnah materials. Shafi(I's claim that Q 24: 2 abrogated Q 4: 15-16 rests 
on an erroneous premise that the word zina in Q 24: 2 is equivalent in all 
material respects to the abominable act described as al-faf:iishah in Q 4: J 5-16. 
As al-Khoei states the word al-faf:iishah can refer to any extremely lewd and 
ugly act between two women, or between two men, or heterosexual, or beyond 
that, and not to anyone of these specifically (al-Khoei, 1987: 310-311). 
His insistence that the second Sunnah, the stoning of Ma<iz, the employer's 
wife abrogated the first Sunnah «Ubada f:iadlth) is arbitrary, especially in the 
face of <All b. )AbI Talib's practice to first flog and then stone the non-virgin 











during the life of the Prophet - claiming that he does so on the basis of the 
Book of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet (ShafiCj, 1983, vol. 7: 190). 
Confronted with cAlI's practice (Sunnah) ShariC! would have to reply that CAlI 
did not know that the cUbada hadlth has been abrogated by the Ma'iz incident, 
it is established in the Sunnah that the virgin is only to be flogged and the non-
virgin only to be stoned (Ibid, 190). Shafi'! would be guilty of pure 
conjecturing. But that is of no concern to him; his dictum that Sunnah never 
contradicts Sunnah (which is true conceptually) allows him to summarily 
assume there is no historic proof of such as a narration - that )All did not 
know the Ma'iz incident. 
Another important indication of inter and intra conflict between the revealed 
texts on the punishment for adultery is cUmar's statement that it was once in 
the Quran; according to one of three modes of naskh its wording has been 
removed, but its ruling remains. Shafiei, however, does not in any way cite this 
alleged verse as proof for the stoning to death of the non-virgin adulterer. At 
this stage we might ask, was this not eUmar's opinion that rajm ought to be the 
punishment for non-virgin adulterers which then came to be understood that he 
regarded it as once having been in the Qur)an. 
Naskh then, as Lowry, says allowed Sharic! to arrange legal texts from Qurcan 
and Sunnah in such a way as to instrumentally rather than arbitrarily prove that 











and harmonious web of interlocking obligations (Lowry, u.p: 144-145). For 
this debate however his employment of naskh to summarily explain away 
conflict between the Quran and Sunnah materials on the one hand, and 
between Sunnah and Sunnah on the other, is only one indication of his zeal, 
through sheer technical mastery, to at all cost uncritically ensure the 
establishment of the bayan. What it does though in the process is to highlight 
the tension and discontinuity between its abstract theory and the content 
through which it is concretized. 
However, somehow it seems, that he was aware of this serious contradiction in 
his bayan scheme. It is for this reason, in my view, that he rejected any theory 
that Quran abrogates Sunnah or that Sunnah abrogates Quran. He might 
therefore have been aware that some of the material, that constituted the 
Sunnah was originally the arbitrary opinions of the early generations 
something he otT course fought against (Shafi<I, 1979: 106-109). ) Abu Zayd 
makes a valid point when he says that ShafiCI distinguished between Quran 
and Sunnah from the perspective of naskh i.e. Quran does not abrogate 
Sunnah nor does Sunnah abrogate Quran to preempt those who rejected 












Whether one agrees with Shari'I or not, he undoubtedly made an important 
intellectual contribution to Islamic jurisprudence with an originality and 
richness of thought, in a way that no other scholar of his age did. In his 
analysis and depth of work, he ranks with Socrates, Descartes, Hegel and 
Marx. He not only interpreted his world, he transformed it and radically so -
something Marx lamented that [most] philosophers never do." Shafi(] 
challenged a tradition, exposed it's incoherency, and refuted the arbitrary 
manner in which it conducted the interpretation of law. His concern was to 
save, albeit conceptually, the Prophetic Sunnah by defining in the Risiilah its 
role in law and establishing the methods of reasoning and interpretation by 
which the law could further be deduced. 
His role and contribution was however elevated by medieval and modern 
Islam. Therefore I:Iallaq has challenged the notion that Shafi(I is the founder of 
a legal theory proper, in other words of u~ul aljiqh (I:Iallaq, 1997: 30-35). In 
1993 he published an article entitled: Was AI-ShaIN the Master Architect of 
Islamic Jurisprudence, in which he dismissed the idea that ShaJiCI was the 
father of Muslim jurisprudence and that there is continuity between his theory 
4 For example on reading Af->Umm - more precisely volume seven ~ one is struck by its 
resemblance to Socrates' questions style form of intellectual dialogue. Shafi'! too engaged his 
interlocutor through questioning and in this manner exposed the latter's contradictions in his 
argument. The difference is that he, unlike Socrates, does not say: "the only thing I know is 
that I know nothing" Shafi'! can and does say: "I know" on the basis of Qur'an and Sunnah and 











and classical II ,'Il7! al-jlqh (ijalIaq, 1994: 587-60 I ).5 Lowry challenges and 
refutes, what had come to be accepted viz. that Shafn has a theory of four 
sources of law i.e. Qur)an, Sunnah, ijmiY and qiyas in that descending order 
(Lowry, 2002: 23-50). 
Certainly, Shaficj's discourse has contradictions, contradictions for \vhich he is 
partly responsible. However, I hasten to make an excuse on his behalf. The 
living Sunnah, in essence, a politically propelled tradition. Had not only 
bequeathed its tremendous political excesses - there were of course many 
revolutionary and moral decisions taken and arbitrary administrative 
innovations, but also had placed a stamp of divinity on some of these opinions 
and interpretations to the exclusion of others. 
Shafic] was a child of the social-religious context into which he was born and 
developed intellectually. He was part of a tradition and he had inherited a 
legacy. In this sense he was a product of his society meaning that his social 
existence influenced, though not determined, his consciousness.6 The hadllh 
~. . 
movement with its isnlid analysis methodology, which became an important 
5 This point emphasises the point made earlier in this thesis (see page 7) as argued by !:IaWiq, 
that Shafi'! al-Risalah was not accepted throughout the third/ninth century and thus had little, 
if any impact, on juristic circles and what could still be termed early jurisprudence. Lowry 
rejects !:IalJaq's thesis saying that !:Iallaq bases his view on the reception of the Risalah during 
the third/ninth century and not its content per se. 
6 This is a Marxist idea that consciousness, as a product of materialism (unlike Hegcl's 
idealism), is determined by social existence and consciollsness that determines social 
existence, It makes sense to say that society has an intluence on consciousness and plays a role 
in its shaping (individual and collective); to claim, however, that society determines 
consciousness in totality is wrong, If this statement of Marx was correct than Marx could not 











instrument in his boyan. did not allow for a critique of ~1adith materials beyond 
its framework. Whether Shafi(l meets with approval or disdain he will for a 
long time remain both a source and object of academic inquiry and discourses. 













In my thesis I have attempted to highlight the arbitrary nature of the living Sunnah and that it 
was an exercise that was dictated to by a politicized rationality. It does not in any way claim or 
advocate that the scholarly element of that tradition was merely a rubberstamp of the political 
authority. However it is clear that the scholars - of the living Sunnah era and beyond - did not 
get to exercise authority, intellectual that is, as freely and as naturally as they ought to, or would, 
have wished to. 
I concretised my critique with the thoughts of Mabriik, Fazlur Rabman, (Abd aI-MajId aI-Saghir, 
Na~r I:Iamid )AbU Zayd and the works by scholars of Western Islamic Studies (I:Iallaq, Lowry, 
and Schacht etc.). My methodology was to select and eliminate, in other 'vyords whilst I benefited 
from their methodologies I applied it where I saw it proving my thesis and rejected what I saw as 
their errors. For example whilst I agree and accept al-Saghir's notion that the scholars had 
authority I reject what I think to be his romanticizing and exaggeration of a notion that their 
authority rivalled the power of the rulers. I think Mabriik is correct in his identifying politics 
(imamah) as the prime mover of Muslim religious discourse, however, [ think him too politically 
reductionist for the legacy of law and theology was not entirely the result of politics and its 
power games. 
I partly accept the Mabrlik - RaJ:!man -) Abu Zayd thesis that the human intellect in terms of 
creativity and progressiveness was sacrificed at the altar of Shafi<I's quest to establish the 











regarded, and hence rejected, as their rather unqualified and ideologically informed appraisal of 
Shafi'! and his ha)'an scheme. To me ShafiCj is not anti-rational in his defining of the role of the 
Prophetic Sunnah in law rather it is his usage of hermeneutical tools that clearly smacks of anti-
rationalism. His aim for uniformity was primarily to put a stop to the excesses of the living 
Sunnah - wherein he achieved measured success - however. he failed in scrutinizing the content 
of the materials which were to a great extent the product of the very legacy he condemned - it 
became the materials from which he reconstructed the content of the Prophetic Sunnah. He was 
never fundamentally anti-rational nor did he intentionally aim at destroying creativity. 
It was my intended aim in doing a critique of Rat.lman to expose his romanticism; a romanticism 
that, in my view, made him to read the early generations as a fairy tale world where legal genius 
and master application of situational interpretation were the natural order. Problems (intellectual 
decline, religious messianism etc.) only started after the first 3 generations when that man called 
Shafi<I let the demons loose. He ate from the forbidden tree of stability, at the devils (in )Abu 
Zayd's reading the political authority whom ShafiCI willingly co-operated) advice, in search of 
uniformity, and we were expelled from the jannah of free-interpretation and progressive 
rationality. A progressive and genuine intellectual tradition will only be realized if we retrieve 
Aladdin's lamp of rationality, from the wizard (Shafic!) and his charming spirit (the hayan), and 
illuminate it with the light of situational interpretation and free-thinking activity. [t is thus an 
arduous journey back to Eden. 
This study should not be viewed as anti-rational. If anything, by simply describing and critically 
evaluating the rationalism of the living Sunnah era and what it bequeathed to subsequent 










generations, it insists on a rethinking and therefore a transformation of our intellectual tradition. 
And that is what this study is, a critical description and nothing more. [n light of this last 
statement it ought to be clear that it did not present any solutions, not in itself (it is unable to do 
so) neither in accordance to a particular discourse, in order to preserve and transform the Islamic 
Cultural legacy. 
It should also not be interpreted as an unqualified support for Shaficl's haydn. Nor should it be 
read as an outright rejection ofRabman's notion; rather it appreciates Rabman's message that in 
essence calls for progressive interpretation and making the moral elan of Islam relevant to 
existential concerns. However it finds Rabman's methodology, rather the methodology that he 
extols i.e. the living Sunnah at odds with that enlightened message as articulated in his work 
Islamic Alethodology in History but more specifically and clearly in his last published work in 
his lifetime (1982) Islam and Modernity ~ his last work published posthumously was edited by 
Ebrahim Moosa. It simply asks for and it is here lies its supports for ShafiC} in principle for 
coherency that would ensure that the basic elan of the Qur)anic weltanschauung is not 
compromised in any undefined endeavour of interpretation and free-thinking. Here, I think that 
RaDman would fully agree with me. This I understand is what he means when he says that we 
have to embrace both the essence and the form of Islam. 
As 'IbrahIm MOsa says, modern Muslim thinkers are challenged not only to be innovative, but 
are simultaneously required to engage \vith tradition. In the words of the poet-philosopher 
Mul)ammad Iqbal the modern Muslim has to rethink the whole system of Islam without 











awareness of the debt that he or she owes to the hereditary intellectual tradition, as well as to the 
tradition in the making: the ongoing and unfolding knO\vledge-making (discursive) tradition 
(Musil, 2003). By emphasizing the role of politics in that tradition it advocates <All Mabruk's 
idea, that for effective and progressive - interpretation of revelation that is constantly 
reproduced in history to be achieved, it must take place within an epistemological paradigm that 
is far removed from politics. The Arab-Muslim \vorld can only emerge from the abyss it 
currently finds itself in if and when its scholars (those religiously educated and those academics 
not formerly schooled in the religious disciplines) engender a commitment and passion for 
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